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Historically, mentally ill individuals have been subject to inhumane treatment. However, 
the late 1700’s and early 1800’s saw major changes in the manner in which the mentally 
infirm were both housed and treated. Beginning in Europe and then spreading to the 
United States, reforms designed to improve those conditions were implemented. Later 
reformations targeted the rights of the mentally ill, and laws were subsequently drafted 
and passed to protect the same. Currently, mentally ill individuals who face involuntary 
commitment for treatment have clear, judicially defined rights. No longer can they be 
involuntarily committed to treatment without legal and procedural safeguards. The judges 
who make involuntary commitment decisions are mandated to follow certain criteria 
during commitment hearings. The current study investigated the training practices of 
American Bar Association (ABA) and American Association of Law Schools (AALS) 
accredited law schools with regard to abnormal psychology and mental health law. The 
purpose of the study was to determine the extent to which mental health judges are 
educationally prepared to apply mental health law as it applies to the abnormal 
psychology/involuntary commitment of those appearing on their dockets. Because 
foundational knowledge in abnormal psychology and extant mental health law is essential 
to making appropriate involuntary commitment decisions, the Deans o f Academic Affairs 
at all ABA and AALS accredited law schools in the United States and U.S. Territories 
were surveyed. Of the 185 accredited schools, 109 responses were received for a total 
response rate of 59%. The results indicate that 41% o f the programs offer no coursework
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in the areas of mental health law and abnormal psychology, with 59% offering 
coursework ranging from 1-6 courses. Further, results indicate that 37% o f the 
responding Deans rated training in mental health law as extremely unimportant to 
somewhat unimportant, and 65% of deans rated training in abnormal psychology the 
same. The results of the study were integrated with the extant literature on therapeutic 
jurisprudence—how the perception of one’s involuntary commitment hearing affects 
treatment outcome—in order to develop possible training recommendations for APA and 




No one can dispute that treatment of the mentally ill has dramatically changed, indeed 
improved, due to humanitarian reform and the application of legal statutes designed to 
protect the rights of those afflicted with mental impairment. Centuries old accounts of the 
hideous conditions under which the mentally ill lived and were “treated,” stand in stark 
contrast to the current care of those so afflicted. No longer can family members, police 
officers, physicians, or judges arbitrarily commit an individual to psychiatric treatment 
without due process and the protections afforded by current mental health law.
The purpose of this paper is not to advocate for reform or for the legislation of 
additional laws to protect those whose mental functions are compromised. The objectives 
o f this study are to examine the standard training practices of American Bar Association 
(ABA) and American Association o f Law Schools (AALS) accredited training programs 
with regard to mental health law and abnormal psychology. The questions addressed in 
this study include: Are judges adequately prepared (educationally) to appropriately apply 
mental health law in involuntary commitment hearings? What percentage o f ABA and 
AALS accredited training programs require training in mental health law and abnormal 
psychology? How much training is required of future judges in these areas? What 
methods are used to train judges in recognizing mental illness and applying the 
appropriate mental health statute? What recommendations emerge for strengthening
judicial preparation in the areas of mental health law and abnormal psychology? Before 
those questions can be addressed, the historical significance of the treatment of the 
mentally ill should be revisited.
CHAPTER n  
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
From Where We’ve Come
Historically, mentally impaired individuals have been subject to inhumane legal and 
“therapeutic” practices. In the 1400’s, one could be indefinitely committed to a mental 
institution with no legal or procedural safeguards. Hilgard (1987) offers a concise look at 
an era whose appalling treatment of those thought to be mentally ill reminds us of how 
far we’ve come. From 1402 until 1930, the Bethlehem Royal Hospital in England was the 
standard o f institutionalization, with similar conditions existing throughout most of 
Europe. Bedlam (Bethlehem Royal’s nickname) came to be the metaphor for anything 
confusing or resembling chaos due to the conditions that existed at the hospital. Referred 
to as inmates, the mentally ill were forced to endure the degrading existence of filth, 
beatings, being chained to one’s bed (often in one’s own excrement), and eating food 
better fit for animals. They were housed in dark, poorly ventilated, and often, unheated 
buildings. “Treatment,” if there was any, often consisted of purging or bloodletting, or of 
subjecting patients to spinning cages or other odd contraptions designed to “cure” the 
afflicted of their mental illness (Hilgard, 1987).
Hilgard (1987), Szasz (1974) and Benjamin (1997), among others, attribute a move to 
more humane treatment of the mentally ill to Frenchman, Philippe Pinel. A physician 
appointed by the leaders of the French Revolution to provide medical oversight at the
beheadings of the revolution’s enemies, Pinel detested such violence and asked for 
reassignment to hospitals for the mad and insane. Assigned in 1793 to head the asylum of 
Bicetre (a hospital for men), Pinel made major changes by treating the mentally ill under 
his care with kindness and compassion, by unchaining them, properly feeding them, and 
halting physical beatings. As quoted in Benjamin (1997), Pinel (1806) mandated that “No 
man was allowed to strike a maniac even in his own defense. No concessions however 
humble, nor complaints nor threats were allowed to interfere with the observance of this 
law. The guilty was instantly dismissed from the service.” (pg 90).
Pinel ultimately extended his work to the Salpetriere, Bicetre’s female counterpart, 
and encouraged the idea of viewing the mentally incapacitated as deserving humane 
treatment, and not the oppressive disdain to which they were currently subjected. Reports 
kept during that era indicated that Pinel’s work contributed to at least one very positive 
outcome. Hothersall (1995), as cited in Benjamin (1997), noted that o f the 261 mentally 
ill individuals admitted to the Bictre in the two years prior to Pinel’s arrival, 58% of them 
died -within a year of their admission. During the first two year’s of Pinel’s reforms, 
however, the mortality rate was a much reduced 12%.
In his chronicle of the treatment of those lacking mental health, Hilard (1987) writes 
o f others who, independent o f Philippe Pinel, forwarded the movement of offering 
civilized care for those whose minds had betrayed them. One such person was a Quaker 
by the name of William Tuke. A tea merchant by trade, Tuke heard about the 
incarceration, beating, and subsequent death o f a mental patient, and began visiting the 
insane asylums in his locale. The wretched conditions of those asylums convinced him to 
open the York Retreat, a country home, in 1796. The prison-like atmosphere o f the
asylums was notably absent from Take’s retreat, as were the standard medical treatments 
of purging and bloodletting. The retreat represented an incredible improvement over 
former conditions.
According to Hilgard (1987), the movement soon spread to the United States and was 
advanced, in part, by Eli Todd who was a practicing physician and who addressed the 
Connecticut Medical Society about the work of Pinel. In 1824, the Hartford Retreat was 
established, with Eli Todd as its medical director. Based on his example, several states 
soon followed suit and founded publicly supported hospitals for the mentally infirm. 
Unfortunately, though, many of those were only marginally better than the asylums that 
had preceded them, and many of the mentally ill continued to be housed in jails or other 
facilities for the needy. It was Dorothea Dix, a Sunday School teacher in Boston, who 
took notice of the maltreatment of mentally ill patients who were routinely housed with 
criminals. Over a 40-year period, she succeeded in improving the facilities in several 
states, building or renovating 30 other state institutions, and influencing the same 
progress in Europe and Japan.
Each of these reforms, observes Hilgard (1987), contributed to asylums becoming 
hospitals whose patients had the opportunity to recover and regain their freedom. Many 
of the patients remained ill but, due to the reforms, they were no longer forced to reside 
with criminals. And even though the mentally ill continued to be regularly restrained, and 
no medical modalities existed to treat them, the early 19* century saw the beginnings of 
humane conditions for some of its neediest individuals. But even with improved living 
conditions, actual treatment was relatively nonexistent at the time. It was Johann Reil, a 
German physician, who in 1803 first introduced the notion that mental illness was a
psychological phenomenon and should be treated with psychological methods. He 
advocated that the term “hospital for psychotherapy,” replace “lunatic asylum” when 
referring to those places designated to treat the mentally ill. He promoted a hospital 
where the incurable would be made comfortable, be given things to occupy their time, 
and the treatable to receive therapy with the hope of curing their mental illness.
Hilgard (1987) and Benjamin (1997) cite others as having early, yet profound effects 
on the course of reforming the process whereby the mentally ill received help for their 
various afflictions. Charcot, Janet, and Freud, among others, further advanced 
psychotherapy as a treatment for mental illness, which clearly offered vast improvements 
on earlier methods. Another influential person was Clifford Beers, who was himself a 
former mentally ill patient, and who, in 1908, wrote The Mind That Found Itself. The 
“Mental Hygiene Movement” was initiated as a result of Beers’ personal and forthcoming 
book. Beers’ own words offer a sad commentary on the need for reform. Indeed, had it 
not been for his will to survive, as well as his articulate accounting of the same, his first­
hand account of his treatment in an insane asylum of the time (and his subsequent 
movement) might have never come to fruition. Beers’ book reveals that he was placed in 
an insane asylum to be treated for “ ... .a mental civil war, which I fought single-handed 
on a battlefield within the compass of my skull.” (pg 1). Indeed, Beers chronicles his stay 
in the asylum, which began with “ ... .fifteen interminable hours....” (pg 133) in a strait 
jacket. In sobering detail he shares with the reader an account o f a particularly cruel, and 
apparently commonplace, attack while in the asylum:
On the night of November 25^, 1902, the head attendant and one of his assistants 
passed my door. They were returning from one of the dances, which at intervals 
during the winter, the management provides for the nurses and attendants. While 
they were within hearing, I asked for a drink of water. It was a carefully worded
request. But they were in a hurry to get to bed, and refused me with curses. Then I 
replied in kind.
“If I come there ITl kill you,” one of them said. “Well, you won’t get in if I can 
help it,” I replied, as I braced my iron bedstead against the door.
My defiance and defences (sic) gave the attendants the excuse for which they had 
said they were waiting; and my success in keeping them out for two or three 
minutes only served to enrage them. By the time they had gained entrance they 
had become furies. One was a young man of twenty-seven. Physically he was a 
fine specimen of manhood; morally he was deficient—thanks to the 
dehumanizing effect of several years in the employ of different institutions whose 
officials countenanced improper methods o f care and treatment. It was he who 
now attacked me in the dark of my prison room. The head attendant stood by, 
holding a lantern which shed a dim light.
The door once open, I offered no further resistance. First I was knocked down. 
Then for several minutes I was kicked about the room—struck, kneed and choked. 
My assailant even attempted to grind his heel into my cheek. In this he failed, for 
I was there protected by a heavy beard which I wore at that time. But my shins, 
elbows, and back were cut by his heavy shoes; and had I not instinctively drawn 
up my knees to my elbows for the protection of my body, I might have been 
seriously, perhaps fatally, injured. As it was, I was severely cut and bruised. 
When my strength was nearly gone, I feigned unconsciousness. This ruse alone 
saved me from further punishment, for usually a premeditated assault is not ended 
until the patient is mute and helpless. When they had accomplished their purpose, 
they left me huddled in a comer to wear out the night as best I might—to live or 
die for all they cared.
The next morning, when the assistant physician appeared, he was accompanied as 
usual by the guilty head attendant who, on the previous night, had held the 
lantern. “Doctor,” I said, “I have something to tell you,”—and I glanced 
significantly at the attendant. “Last night I had a most unusual experience. I have 
had many imaginary experiences during the past two years and a half, and it may 
be that last night’s was not real. Perhaps the whole thing was phantasmagoric— 
like what I used to see during the first months of my illness. Whether it was so or 
not I shall leave you to judge. It just happens to be my impression that I was 
brutally assaulted last night. If it was a dream, it is the first thing of the kind that 
ever left visible evidence on my body.”
With that I uncovered to the doctor a score of bruises and lacerations. I knew 
these would be more impressive than any words of mine. The doctor put on a 
knowing look, but said nothing and soon left the room. His guilty subordinate 
tried to appear unconcerned, and I really believe he thought me not absolutely 
sure of the events o f the previous night, or at least unaware of his share in them 
(Beers, 1908, pgs 160-163).
Beers’ movement, “I have decided to devote the next few years of my life to 
correcting abuses now in existence in every asylum in this country... ” (pg. 199) focused 
on the problems of the mentally ill, as well as increased the awareness of those inclined 
to acknowledge a heretofore relatively ignored and disenfranchised population.
But change was slow. Even in the 1960’s, the president of the American Psychiatric
Association referred to America’s state hospitals as “bankrupt beyond remedy” (Berlin,
2000). Social activists of the day were still highly critical of the treatment the mentally ill
received at the hands o f govemment-ftmded institutions. Berlin (2000), in his book The
Hidden Prejudice, Mental Disability on Trial, quotes Albert Deutsch, who testified
before Congress about his investigations of the state hospitals of the day (1961):
Some physicians I interviewed frankly admitted that the animals of nearby 
piggeries were better housed, fed and treated than many of the patients on their 
wards. I saw hundreds of sick people shackled, strapped, straitjacketed, and bound 
to their beds. I saw mental patients forced to eat meals with their hands because 
there were not enough spoons and other tableware to go around—not because
they couldn’t be trusted to eat like humans I found evidence of physical
brutality, but that paled into insignificance when compared with the excruciating 
suffering stemming from prolonged, enforced, idleness, herdlike crowding, lack 
of privacy, depersonalization, and the overall atmosphere of neglect. The fault 
lay...with the general community that not only tolerated but enforced these 
subhuman conditions through financial penury, ignorance, fear and indifference. 
(pg ll4 ).
Other social activists became involved in the move for better treatment of the mentally 
ill, and the 1960’s and 1970’s were rife with debates about the same. Soon, the debates 
gravitated to the legal domain and lawsuits and constitutional inquiries followed in an 
attempt to offer the mentally ill full protection under the law (Berlin, 2000).
Indeed, the process o f reformation had begun, and the early 19* century began the 
process of significant improvement, as compared to its 18* century predecessor, with 
regard to how the mentally ill were viewed, housed, and treated. Conditions remained far
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from ideal, but were in stark contrast to earlier times. But however improved conditions 
were, the fact remained that coerced entrance into the world of institutionalization was 
relatively uncomplicated, and could still be accomplished against one’s will, and without 
legal, medical, or procedural safeguards.
A Brief History of Civil Commitment
With the development o f state and public hospitals wherein the mentally impaired 
could receive help for their various conditions, concomitant attention was given to the 
process of civilly committing one to such treatment. Prior to the mid 19**’ century, family 
members, police, physicians or others could easily commit the mentally infirm to 
involuntary treatment, solely on the basis that the person was “in need of treatment.” It 
was generally assumed that family members, and others, were acting in the patient’s best 
interests and so little judicial involvement was deemed necessary. However, when state 
facilities began to proliferate, it became necessary to look at some controls for the 
process of civil commitment, and so the much needed, albeit immature, process of 
legislative purview was initiated. It now became more difficult for others to civilly 
commit the heretofore-disenfranchised “lunatics” and “insane,” as the mentally ill now 
had the beginnings of a legal voice. No longer could greedy relatives collude with 
physicians to institutionalize their wealthy, but disparaged, family members (as was often 
purported to be the case), nor could troublesome family members be civilly committed 
without a modicum o f due process (Appelbaum 1994).
Much like Clifford Beers, another former patient, Mrs. E.P.W. Packard, sought change 
with regard to the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill. She advocated for jury 
trials for those faced with civil commitment so that the rationale for such action could be
formally adjudicated. The work of Mrs. Packard, combined with that o f others, had the 
effect of requiring hearings for the mentally ill—including those at private hospitals. It 
also impacted the medical aspect of commitment by requiring physicians to actually 
examine potential candidates prior to proceedings for commitment, as well as sign an 
affidavit that noted that the physician did not stand to gain financially from such an 
action (Appelbaum 1994; Szasz 1963).
The public attention afforded the process o f involuntarily detaining patients waxed 
and waned according to the political emphasis of the times. When those advocating rapid 
hospitalization brought their message to the fore, the push for judicial reform and 
addition of stringent controls was reduced. However, when a more civil libertarian 
approach was promoted, protective, legal statutes took the spotlight, and the push for 
change intensified. Indeed, the first half of the twentieth century saw an abundance of the 
former, as more and more concern was expressed over patients having to endure legal 
hearings more reminiscent of criminal proceedings than expeditious treatment for the 
mentally ill. Social activists proposed that the power of civil commitment be transferred 
away from the court and into the domain of medicine. Using a medico-legal model, one 
or two physicians would assume the authority to make such decisions, with a patient 
having an after-the-fact hearing only if  he/she so desired. Some states adopted such 
statutes. Others elected to continue with mandatory judicial hearings, but left an as yet 
unmentioned, although significant, problem in the hands of judges. The problem, that of 
the judge deciding whether or not to inform civil commitment candidates about their 
hearings, was ever salient, and became the crux of future judicial decisions with regard to 
involuntary commitment (Appelbaum 1994).
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The legislative reform of involuntary commitment laws has been, like most legal
major decisions, more a process than an event. Various tenets have influenced that
process and have been reflected through the years in numerous decisions made on state
and Supreme Court levels. Applebaum (1997), in one of his many looks at the laws and
process of civil commitment, sums up the reforms made from 1964-1979:
These forces, taken as a whole, culminated in a radical transformation of the law 
of civil commitment that essentially altered the status quo in every state in the 
nation over the course of 15 years. Use of involuntary commitment was limited to 
persons who were likely to be dangerous to themselves or others, the latter 
category including those so impaired as to be unable to meet their basic needs. 
The law allowing hospitalization of persons solely because they were “in need of 
treatment”—the historic standard o f commitment in this country—was 
abandoned. In addition, a set o f procedural rights was imported from the criminal 
law, including rights to a hearing, notice, representation by an attorney, to testify 
on ones’ own behalf, to call and cross-examine witnesses, and to exclude 
evidence that did not meet the ordinary standards of admissibility. Although states 
varied in the details o f their statutes, the basic thrust of the reforms was similar in 
every state (pgs 136-137).
Citing the copious court cases that provided the foundation for today’s civil 
commitment laws is beyond the scope of this paper. However, even the most concise 
history of emergency detention laws would not be complete without taking note of the 
Federal Court case of Lessard v. Schmidt. Although she couldn’t have known it at the 
time, Alberta Lessard would significantly influence the course of laws surrounding civil 
commitment, and greatly alter procedural mandates as they applied to the mentally ill and 
due process. According to Appelbaum (1994) Ms. Lessard was taken into custody in the 
Fall of 1971 by two police officers, and subsequently escorted to a local mental health 
center near her home in Wisconsin. Little is recorded as to what prompted authorities to 
place Alberta under an order o f “emergency detention for mental observation,” but it is 
known that she voiced unusual ideas and that she may have been a danger to herself 
several weeks before her detention.
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Three days after being taken into custody. County Court Judge Christ T. Seraphim 
presided over a hearing wherein the two police officers, who had removed Ms. Lessard 
from her home, reiterated their rationale for taking her into protective custody. They must 
have been persuasive in their allegations, because Judge Seraphim authorized the 
hospital, in which Lessard was being held, to keep her an additional ten days—even 
though Lessard herself was not present at the hearing, nor had she received any 
notification of it. What happened next would have a profound influence on civil 
commitment laws in the United States (Appelbaum 1994).
Several days after Lessard's first hearing, a psychiatrist from the hospital told the 
court that the patient was suffering from schizophrenia and recommended “permanent 
commitment.” Again, without Lessard being present, or even having knowledge of the 
hearings. Judge Seraphim prolonged her detention during two subsequent court 
proceedings. At no time was Ms. Lessard given the opportunity to refute the claims being 
made about her mental health. Whether the court underestimated Lessard’s mental acuity, 
or whether no thought was given to her feelings about the matter, is not known. What is 
known is that at Lessard’s formal commitment hearing on November 24, 1971, Judge 
Seraphim ordered 30 more days of commitment based on the fact that she was “mentally 
ill.” What is also known is that Lessard contacted Milwaukee Legal Services and 
obtained legal representation. Moreover, her attorney quickly filed suit in federal court on 
her behalf and on behalf of others in the state of Wisconsin who were similarly affected. 
The wheels of justice turned, albeit slowly, but Alberta Lessard had been heard. Indeed, 
at the impetus of one allegedly mentally ill woman, a new standard for involuntary 
commitment was bom (Appelbaum 1994).
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Nearly a year after Alberta Lessard was involuntarily removed from her home and
committed to psychiatric treatment, the court handed down its opinion. Appelbaum
(1994) outlines the opinion, as well as the impact it had on future laws.
The court held that “the state must bear the burden of proving that there is an 
extreme likelihood that if  the person is not confined he will do immediate harm to 
himself or others.” This finding of dangerousness must be based on a recent overt 
act, attempt, or threat to inflict substantial harm. As if to emphasize the restrictive 
nature of this standard, the judges commented in a foomote, “Even an overt 
attempt to substantially harm oneself cannot be the basis for commitment unless 
the person is found to be 1) mentally ill and 2) in immediate danger at the time of 
the hearing of doing further harm to oneself.” The court also addressed the 
question of the procedures that must attend the commitment process. It ruled that 
a preliminary hearing must be held within 48 hours of detention to determine 
whether probable cause existed to believe that the person was committable, with 
rights to notice, to attendance, and to representation by counsel. A full hearing 
was required within 10 to 14 days.
Lessard dispensed with the historic standard for civil commitment and, in a 
stroke, substituted a vastly constricted dangerousness requirement. 
Simultaneously, it imported a rigorous set of procedures from the criminal law 
that went far beyond those imposed during any previous period of reform. By the
end of the 1970’s, every state either had changed its statute to restrict
hospitalization to persons who were dangerous to themselves or others (including 
dangerousness by virtue of “grave disability,” defined as an inability to met one’s 
basic needs) or had interpreted its preexisting statute in this way so as to “save” it 
from being found unconstitutional. The triumph was complete for those who 
believed that the state’s power to confine the mentally ill, although legitimate, 
represented a massive invasion of liberty that could only be permitted in the most 
limited circumstances (pgs 27-28).
Reactions to the dramatic changes in the rights afforded to those presumed mentally ill 
have varied. Embraced by some, and eschewed by others, subsequent civil commitment 
law has been examined, reexamined, commented on, challenged, and explored at length 
in the literature. One state in particular. New Jersey, decided to take a close look at the 
extent and limitations of their mental health law. That look culminated in a seven-year 
reform, which saw their mental health law repealed and amended. The reformed bill was 
passed by the assembly and is summed up in the State’s Committee Statement, which
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reflects their progressive intent (Senate Revenue, Finance and Appropriations Committee
Statement Assembly, No. 1813—L. 1987, c. 116):
This bill, as amended, revises the statutes concerning involuntary civil 
commitment to reflect clinical and programmatic advances and to incorporate 
language based on recent court decisions and rules. The bill provides that a person 
shall be involuntarily committed to a short-term care or psychiatric facility or a 
special psychiatric hospital only if  mentally ill and dangerous to himself, others or 
to property, and be retained based upon clear and convincing evidence only. The 
bill requires treatment consistent with the person’s clinical condition and a person 
shall be hospitalized only when clinically necessary. This bill also encourages the 
development of community-based mental health screening services and short-term 
care facilities (pg 256).
Mental health law and the issue o f civil commitment, continues to be debated by legal 
and social scientists. Although beyond the scope of this study, the legal and societal 
ramifications of certain forms of involuntary commitment go beyond typical mental 
illnesses and extend into domains that cause heated debate. One such debate centers on 
the civil commitment of sexual offenders, often broadly described as having impulse 
control disorders. Most salient to the debate is whether sexual offenders can be 
effectively treated, and whether their particular mental illness requires commitment 
beyond the period of judicial incarceration until such time they can be deemed no longer 
a danger to others. Laws covering just this eventuality are now appearing on the books of 
several states, and add to the ever-changing and controversial landscape of civil 
commitment (Cornwell, 1998).
Indeed, the rise of mental health courts has been receiving a great deal of attention. 
The American Psychological Association Monitor (2001) reported that recent legislation 
to create a national demonstration program for mental health courts recently passed 
through the 106* Congress with bipartisan support. This legislation will allow for the 
Department of Justice to use up to $10 million annually to give grants to state and local
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governments for programs to divert mentally ill or mentally retarded offenders into 
voluntary outpatient or inpatient treatment. Given that social scientists estimate that some 
300,000 mentally ill individuals occupy our prisons and jails at any given time, such a 
program might have the power to both treat the mentally ill, and reduce the load on the 
criminal justice system (APA, 2001).
In an earlier, but related article, the American Psychological Monitor (2000) reported
that 16% of all inmates and state prisons suffer from mental illness, and that from 24-
40% o f America’s mentally ill will have contact with the criminal justice system. The
article noted that too many mentally ill people are sent to jail or prison instead of
receiving treatment. As a solution, some states are establishing the aforementioned
mental health courts, where the mentally ill are ordered into treatment, instead of being
incarcerated. The article recounts the case o f “Mary,” a woman with schizophrenia who
had been accused of loitering. Under the old system, Mary would have had to wait, in
jail, for 21 days for her case to be heard. Under the mental health court system, Mary was
instead mandated into treatment for her schizophrenia as well as her substance abuse. In
San Bernardino, California, according to the Monitor article, the demand for mental
health court services has overwhelmed their capacity to provide them.
San Bernardino began its mental health court. Supervised Treatment After 
Release (STAR) last January. As with others o f its type, the court places mentally 
ill criminal offenders in an intensive mental health treatment program instead of 
jail. But it’s also unique because it’s one of the few to handle predominantly 
nonviolent felony cases, and it requires participants to live in board-and-care 
facilities where they receive counseling, medications and supervision.
The country’s public defender recommends defendants for the mental health 
court—most have been diagnosed with serious mental illness and are facing 
substantial jail time. The program was designed to last one year but participants 
may spend more or less time in the program, depending on their individual
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progress and how long it takes them to get back on their feet. They may also hold 
a job or go to school while in the program, depending on their abilities (pg 59).
The subject o f civil commitment can elicit some very strident opinions from those
familiar with the process of treating and protecting the rights of the mentally ill.
Basically, two general positions emerge with regard to the mandated treatment of the
mentally ill. Following is an overview of those contrasting views.
Civil Libertarians vs. “Dving With Rights On”
The process of formulating laws to protect the rights of the mentally ill has not been
without debate. Disparate views have marked the judicial/mental health landscape, and
have been alternately responsible for bringing discrete agendas to the fore and
influencing the direction o f the legislation at the time. The strata of opinion with regard to
the rights of those who may be in need of mental health treatment is much more complex
than the dichotomous presentation of civil libertarians vs. those who advocate for more
protective positions of the right, or need, to treat those so afflicted. It is doubtful that
anyone familiar with the tenets of the individual arguments would consider them totally
and mutually exclusive. And yet two basic positions have emerged with regard to the
rights afforded those who suffer from mental impairment. For the purposes of this paper,
those positions have been titled Civil Libertarians, those advocating against what they
consider legally sanctioned coercion, and “Dying With Rights On,” a term made popular
by a Wisconsin psychiatrist by the name of Darryl Treffert, an early critic of civil
commitment law reform (Appelbaum, 1994). Although both sides o f the debate have
merit and could be explored at length, their full exploration is beyond the scope of this
paper and so will be only overviewed here.
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One o f  the more prolific, and controversial, writers o f treatises addressing the rights o f 
the mentally ill (a term he feels stigmatizes those so labeled) is physician Thomas S. 
Szasz. In his 1974 publication o f The Myth o f  M ental Illness, he postulates that psychiatry 
is really a  process o f  “moral, political, and social action.” A  strident protector o f  the 
rights o f  those whose behavior is often considered deviant, Szasz describes the
psychiatrist “  as social engineer or controller o f social deviance. In this role, the
psychiatrist acts as priest and policeman, arbitrator and judge, parent and warden: he 
coerces and manipulates, punishes and rewards, and otherwise influences and compels
people, often by relying on the police power o f  the state ” Szasz leaves no doubt in
the reader’s mind as to his position with regard to the involuntaiy or civil commitment o f  
the mentally ill when he writes: “I am opposed, on moral and political grounds, to all 
psychiatric interventions which are involuntary; and, on personal grounds, to all such 
interventions which curtail the client’s autonomy” (Szasz, 1974).
Michael Berlin, a  less controversial, yet equally prolific social scientist with regard to
researching the rights o f  the mentally ill, has done much in the way o f  offering a well-
researched and balanced view  o f this debate-provoking subject. Indeed, he has dedicated
his career to investigating the rights o f the mentally ill as well as their treatment (personal
communication, 2000). In his latest book. The Hidden Prejudice—M ental D isability on
Trial (Berlin, 2000), Berlin speaks to the sometimes capricious nature o f  civil
commitment. He notes that involuntary commitment decisions may not always be
centered on “clinically coherent grounds.”
Doctors recommend hospitalization ‘whenever they are in doubt about a  patient’s 
potential for suicide since it is always better to err on the side o f  safety,’ 
notwithstanding empirical research concluding that it is not possible to predict 
suicide, even among high-risk groups o f  inpatients. This type o f  decision making
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blocks access to any inquiry about whether the patient has social support in the 
community, a factor that is frequently associated with positive mental health 
outcomes, (pg 87)
With regard to the ethical actions of some who want to mandate treatment under any
circumstance, Berlin (2000) writes further:
There is a flip side to this arrogation o f morality. Using the rankest form of 
passive aggressive behavior, some mental health professionals have advised 
families to put their mentally ill relatives out on the streets where they will either 
find life so difficult that they will accept treatment or will deteriorate to the point 
at which there will no longer be any question as to their eligibility for involuntary 
civil commitment. To suggest that this stands both medical ethics and the legal 
system on their heads belabors the obvious, (pg 87)
Berlin’s research (2000) acknowledges that so great are the motivations of some to 
involuntarily commit, that they may “reshape” a patient’s actual presentation by reporting 
a higher level o f dangerousness in order to have them committed. Further, those 
individuals who “attempt to assert their constitutional and statutory rights” are often 
viewed as “trouble makers” (pg 89).
The debate over the moral, medical and legal legitimacy of involuntarily committing a 
person to treatment is not without vehemence, nor is it limited to an American forum. 
Mason & Jermings (1997), commenting on Britain’s 1983 Mental Health Act, use such
phrases as “professional hostage taking,” and note that “Involuntary commitment........
can be viewed as analogous to imprisonment: patients lose their liberty and many of their 
civil rights and are forced to adhere to institutional regulations.” Further, they state that
“The use o f the Mental Health Act can be seen as a weapon of social control exercised
under the influence of medical jurisprudence.”
Others have written about the right to refuse treatment. Indeed, legal scholar Bruce 
Winnick (1997) dedicated an entire volume to the subject when he wrote The Right to
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Refuse Mental Health Treatment. In his book, Winnick describes the potential for abuse
when involuntarily committing individuals to treatment. He says that involuntary
treatment, despite its controversy, is the general practice in many settings. He states that
oftentimes patients, in addition to being forced to reside on an impatient unit, are also
required to participate in psychotherapy, and are routinely given psychotropic medication
without consent. Further, he cites the use of involuntary ECT (electroconvulsive therapy)
as a way o f modifying behavior. Winnick cautions the reader as to the potential for abuse
that such forced treatment can cause:
Lurking in the background is the ominous specter of behavior control made 
possible by the coercive use of these techniques. When a society determines that 
an individual is mentally ill or is a criminal offender, it engages in a particularly 
strong form of deviance labeling. Such labeling often has the effect of depriving 
those so labeled of basic liberty. People determined to be mentally ill frequently 
are committed to psychiatric hospitals, and those convicted of crimes often are 
sentenced to prison. But so socially deviant are those the state labels as mentally 
ill and as criminals that it does not stop at labeling them and taking away their 
liberty. In addition, we try to change them through impositions o f often intrusive
treatment or “rehabilitation.” For patients involuntarily institutionalized a thin
line often separates treatment for mental illness from control o f social deviance 
(pgs 5-6).
Nevertheless, Wiimick (1997) states that more and more states are placing statutory 
limits on the coercive treatment o f mental patients, most notably the state of California. 
Indeed, Winnick cites copious constitutional law that he believes may support, in the case 
of involuntary treatment, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which was designed to prevent not only discrimination based on race, but 
also to mandate that similar individuals be treated alike by the government. That clause, 
according to Winnick, could be interpreted in such a way as to apply to the coercive 
treatment o f  the mentally ill.
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With respect to the future of the right to refuse treatment, ever the topic of hot debate,
Winnick (1997) advocates the use o f advance directives and advance planning. Indeed,
Winnick states that the Supreme Court’s landmark “right-to-die” case, Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department o f  Health can apply not only to the terminally ill, but to
the mentally ill who are faced with involuntary treatment as well.
Rather than viewing treatment refusal issues as disputes requiring judicial or 
administrative resolution, the logic of Cruzan allows them to be seen as 
opportunities for advance planning, which in many cases may avoid dispute
resolution Under Cruzan, patients are given an opportunity to express their
desires about future treatment. Under these developments, patients are 
empowered to make decisions in advance concerning future health care needs
arising at a time when they may be incapacitated This analysis of Cruzan and
its implications suggest that mental patients during a period of competency should 
be able to make advance determinations concerning hospitalization and treatment 
issues. The due process liberty interest recognized in Cruzan would apply to all 
persons, the term used in the Due Process Clauses o f both the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to describe the beneficiaries of their protection against 
governmental deprivation. Both those suffering from mental illness and those 
suffering from life-threatening medical conditions may exercise this liberty 
interest as long as they are competent at the time of the expression of choice, even 
though both may be incompetent at the time when that choice is given effect (pgs 
391-393).
The bipolar pendulum of the rights of the mentally ill and their need for treatment has 
long moved between the two poles as dictated by the zietgeist of the times. As mentioned 
earlier, Danyl Treffert was a psychiatrist whose opinions paralleled those who advocated 
for the treatment, albeit sometimes mandatory, of the mentally ill. It was Treffert who 
made popular the phrase that described the civil libertarian movement as giving the 
mentally ill the freedom of “dying with their rights on” (Appelbaum, 1994). A second 
psychiatrist, who was also a professor of law and psychiatry at Harvard Law School, 
proposed what he felt was a balance between mandatory treatment and personal liberty 
with his “Thank You Theory” of civil commitment (Appelbaum, 1994). “Under this
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approach, a set o f  criteria w ould be developed, emphasizing patients’ need for treatment, 
incapacity to make their ow n decisions, and reasonable expectations that they might 
benefit from care, w ith the goal o f  identifying a  group o f  patients who could reasonably 
be expected to be grateful, at the conclusion o f their hospitalization, that commitment had 
occurred” (Appelbaum, 1994).
W ith regard to the m ovem ent for mandated treatment, Berlin (2000) writes;
The existence o f  a  statutory right to treatment was first judicially recognized by 
the District o f  C olum bia circuit Court o f  Appeals in the unlikely setting o f a  
habeas corpus case brought by an insanity acquittée. In R om e  v. Cameron, the 
court found that a  D istrict o f  Columbia hospitalization law established such a  
statutory right, reasoning that ‘the purpose o f  involuntary hospitalization is 
treatment, not punishm ent,’ quoting a statement by the ac t’s sponsor that, when a 
person is deprived o f  liberty because o f  need o f  treatm ent and that treatment is not 
supplied, such deprivation is ‘tantamount to a  denial o f  due process.’ The hospital 
thus needed to  dem onstrate that it had m ade a  ‘bona fide effort’ to ‘cure or 
improve’ the patient, tha t inquiries into the patient’s needs and conditions were 
renewed periodically, and  that the program provided was suited to the patient’s 
‘particular needs’ (pg 115).
Berlin (2000) also speaks to w hat some consider the constitutional (not just statutory)
right o f  mentally ill individuals to  receive treatment:
The m ost important case finding a  constitutional right to  treatm ent was, without 
doubt, Wyatt v. Stickney. W yatt was clear: ‘The purposes o f  involuntary 
hospitalization for treatm ent purposes is treatment and not mere custodial care or 
punishment. This is the only justification from a constitutional standpoint, that 
allows civil com m itm ent to [a state hospital]....To deprive any citizen o f his or 
her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane 
therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatm ent violates the very 
fundamentals o f  due process.’ It subsequently found three ‘fundamental 
conditions for adequate and effective treatm ent’: (a) a  humane psychological and 
physical environment, (b) qualified staff in numbers sufficient to administer 
adequate treatm ent, and (c) individualized treatment plans (pg 115).
One o f  the central tenets o f  the  debate surrounding involuntary commitment is the 
aspect o f dangerousness. The issue o f  dangerousness was brought to  the fore in the 1975 
Supreme Court case o f  O ’C onnor v. Donaldson, in which Kenneth Donaldson sued the
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hospital superintendent for depriving him of his freedom in the absence of any 
justification of dangerousness to others. Justice Steward, in his majority opinion, 
determined that “A finding of mental illness alone cannot justify a State’s locking a 
person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement” 
(Linbum 1998).
Even though trial testimony demonstrated that Kenneth Donaldson posed no danger to 
others, he was involuntarily committed to a Florida state hospital for almost 15 years, 
during which he repeatedly and unsuccessfully sought his fi-eedom. According to Linbum 
(1998), “The evidence showed that Donaldson’s confinement was a simple regime of 
enforced custodial care, not a program designed to alleviate or cure his supposed illness.” 
As a result of O’Connor v. Donaldson, dangerousness became the salient standard on 
which civil commitment was based.
Some believe that the Donaldson decision had untoward consequences in that 
protection due to dangerousness was elevated but the need to treat the mentally ill 
downtrodden. Linbum (1998), notes that “The view that dangerousness is the critical 
justification for civil commitment has thus marginalized a central purpose o f civil 
commitment—to provide care and treatment for the severely mentally ill. Emphasizing 
dangerousness has tended to criminalize such commitments by skewing the rationale in 
favor of the state’s police power at the expense of it parens patriae responsibility” (to 
provide care for the mentally ill).
Another social scientist offers commentary on the debate when he states that 
“ ... .concentration upon seeking the least restrictive altemative in patient care has meant 
that some patients and their families have been occasionally denied access to care” (Prins,
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1996). Contrasting that with the other side of the debate, Prins also noted that, “There 
would seem to be some grounds for concluding that we should adopt a  very cautious 
approach to an over-widespread use of the law in matters concerning the management of 
social and personal ills. In addition, a proliferation of procedures which accompany 
legislation may only serve to inhibit good practice and produce iatrogenic consequences. 
Somehow, a balance must be achieved between the view of Mr. Bumble, who described 
the law as ‘a ass, a idiot’ and the jurist Lord Coke, who considered that ‘the law is the 
perfection o f reason.’”
States have long struggled to find a balance between protecting the civil liberties of 
their mentally ill, while ensuring that opportunities for treatment (however mandated) are 
extended to those in need of such services. Aviram and Weyer (1996) offered a succinct 
conceptualization of the debate in the opening of their paper Changing Trends in Mental 
Health Legislation: Anatomy o f  Reforming a Civil Commitment Law. They wrote:
“During the past twenty-five years, U.S. public policy involving civil commitment of 
persons with mental illness swung like a pendulum between two opposing poles: the 
medical-psychiatric and the legal models. The former emphasizes medical considerations 
of a person’s need for treatment and allows easier commitment to psychiatric institutions; 
the latter focuses on legal procedural safeguards and protection of civil liberties during 
commitment proceedings and makes commitment more restrictive.”
Aviram and Weyer (1996) highlight the evolving and often alternating trends o f civil 
libertarian approaches and social service orientations in their paper, and note that the 
special interests of the parties shaping mental health legislation are often outside the 
mental health system.
23
The seemingly dichotomous positions of the rights of the mentally ill and their need 
for treatment will continue to be debated. But even with that debate ongoing, a third 
position, albeit separate but related, has emerged which represents another evolution of 
how we view those we term mentally ill, as well as the laws and dictates that govern their 
treatment.
Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Therapeutic jurisprudence represents a profound change from an era of Bedlam-type 
treatment of the mentally ill. It not only takes a compassionate view of those who are 
afflicted with mental impairment, but it also investigates the impact of relevant legal 
mandates on the same. David Wexler and Bruce Winnick (1996), two of the most prolific 
researchers in this area, explain the need for and utility of therapeutic jurisprudence: “The 
therapeutic jurisprudence heuristic suggests that the law itself can be seen to function as a 
kind of therapist or therapeutic agent. Legal rules, legal procedures, and the roles of legal 
actors (such as lawyers and judges) constitute social forces that, like it or not, often 
produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences. Therapeutic j  urisprudence proposes 
that we be sensitive to those consequences, and that we ask whether the law’s 
antitherpeutic consequences can be reduced, and its therapeutic consequences enhanced, 
without subordinating due process and other justice values.”
A full review of therapeutic jurisprudence is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, a brief look at its essence, especially as it pertains to involuntary commitment, 
will highlight just how far we’ve come from the days of chaining the mentally ill to their 
beds or spinning them in cages to alleviate their distress.
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In one of their many publications. Law in a Therapeutic Key, Wexler and Winick 
(1996), carefully look at the psychological consequences of judicial procedures on those 
brought before the bar for a civil commitment hearing. They note the importance of 
“neutral fact-finding” in a procedure that has the potential o f seriously curtailing 
individual freedom; “The identification of neutral fact-finding as the criterion against 
which to evaluate the adequacy of judicial hearings is consistent with the legal literature 
on procedures. That literature typically focuses on issues such as bias, honesty, and 
expertise. These aspects are regarded as important because they are believed to influence 
the ability o f  a procedure to reach an objectively correct outcome. ... .I f  the key concern 
in devising commitment procedures is determining the true mental state o f  the person in 
order to make the best decision about commitment, then this balance o f  authority should 
be shaped by evaluations o f  the capabilities ofprofessional andjudicial decision­
makers.” (italics added)
Wexler and Winnick (1996) summarize their research about what the mentally ill 
themselves think and feel with regard to civil commitment procedures. “People’s 
evaluation of the fairness o f judicial hearings are affected by the opportunities which 
those procedures provide for people to participate, by the degree to which people judge 
that they are treated with dignity and respect, and by judgments about the trustworthiness 
of authorities. Each o f these three factors has more influence on judgments of procedural 
justice than do either evaluations o f neutrality or evaluations of the favorableness o f the 
outcome of the hearing.”
When mentally ill individuals positively evaluate the process whereby they are 
constrained to receive help, they are more likely to benefit from that help, according to
25
Wexler and Winnick (1996). “If people become estranged from authority, distrusting 
others; believing that they are vulnerable, and hence feeling insecure; and lacking in 
feelings of self-worth, those consequences are disadvantageous and preferably could be 
avoided. Historically, many of these negative psychological consequences have occurred 
in the context of professional commitment hearings. Judicial hearings, which have been 
more sensitive to issues of due process, may have more positive psychological 
consequences. Ultimately, decisions about the desirability of different judicial procedures 
need to be responsive to both the objective quality of the decisions made and to the 
psychological consequences o f varying types of decision-making procedures.” Winnick 
notes that even though mandatory treatment may be necessary, as in the cases of those 
who are severely mentally ill, coercion should be avoided whenever possible because of 
its anti-therapeutic effects on the recipient (Winnick 1997).
Perlin (2000) also speaks to therapeutic jurisprudence. He concludes that it can be 
used as an effective tool to help those who are suffering from mental illness and who may 
be refusing treatment, and whose attorneys seek to represent their client’s expressed 
interests:
The empirical research done regarding the right to refuse treatment for mental 
health patients coupled with a survey of the practical implementation of this right 
indicates that patients’ rights advocates and attorneys, in enforcing the right to 
refuse treatment, could benefit from using therapeutic jurisprudence. Therapeutic 
jurisprudence provides a tool to allow counsel representing mentally disabled 
persons to identify anti-therapeutic problems and to attempt to resolve these 
issues to enhance patients’ civil rights in a therapeutic manner. Finally, 
therapeutic jurisprudence is a potential means for attorneys and advocates 
representing medication refusers to attempt to see how they can improve the 
quality of their advocacy to ensure that the expressed interest of their clients is 
represented (pg 285).
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Other social scientists agree that the process whereby individuals are involuntarily 
detained impacts the detainee more than the actual detention. The psychological 
consequences of the judicial procedures themselves, asserts Tyler (1996), highly 
influence how the mentally ill view imposed restrictions on their freedom, and are highly 
relevant to the laws as they now stand.
While investigating the effects of civil commitment on involuntary patients, Kjellin, 
Anderson, CandeQord, Palmstiema and Wallsten (1997) found an association between 
perceived respect for autonomy by authorities and self-reported improvement in mental 
health. They noted that, “The aim of both involuntary and voluntary psychiatric care must 
be to achieve as many benefits as possible at the lowest [ethical] cost.”
Therapeutic jurisprudence is not without its critics. Wirmick and Wexler (1996), 
proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence have included in their book. Law in a 
Therapeutic Key, chapters that take a critical look at the idea of making the practice of 
mental health law more therapeutic. Perlin, Gould, and Dorfman (1996) critically review 
the concept in chapter 38 of Wirmick and Wexler's book: “Indeed, one of the most 
important controversies that has emerged from the first generation of therapeutic 
jurisprudence scholarship is the question of whether, as a result of therapeutic 
jurisprudence, mental disability law will be more therapeutic or more jurisprudential. 
Some of the most important criticism of therapeutic jurisprudence flows from what is 
perceived as its willingness to subordinate civil libertarian concerns to therapeutic 
interests; at the same time, some of the enthusiasm that therapeutic jurisprudence has 
engendered may flow implicitly from the same assumption.
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On the other hand, W exler and W innick recognize explicitly that therapeutic 
jurisprudence cannot and must not trump civil libertarian interests.” Petri la, in chapter 34 
o f  W exler and W innick’s book, offers a  different type o f  criticism. “ [Therapeutic 
jurisprudence] fails to question who decides what represents a  therapeutic outcome. 
Instead, [it] assumes that research scientists and lawyers will decide whether a  particular 
legal rule or intervention has therapeutic value. People treated voluntarily or coercively 
by mental health professionals and subject to legal rules governing the conditions and 
terms o f that treatm ent are largely ignored. As a result, people who can provide the best 
information about the therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences o f  legal/therapeutic 
interventions are excluded from participating in the analysis o f  what is or is not in their 
interest.”
Unfortunately, there is a  virtual lack o f studies with respect to general inpatient 
outcome research and how the involuntary commitment process, and the client’s 
participation therein, functions to predict therapeutic success or failure. However, Tyler 
(1996), while acknowledging the dearth o f  relevant studies in this area, points to other 
studies that have researched how people are typically affected by judicial hearings in an 
attempt to glean information applicable to involuntary commitment hearings and their 
outcome. Indeed, he cites three elements that are important determinants o f  how people 
judge procedural fairness. Those elements are participation, dignity and trust.
Tyler (1996) notes that individuals involved in judicial proceedings consistently 
view them as fairer when they have been allowed to participate in the same. Indeed, when 
one is allowed to speak or exert some control over the process o f  proceedings, and when 
one is allowed to share in decision-making, feelings o f  fairness are enhanced.
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Interestingly, even when people believe that what they have to say about their situation 
has little or no influence over the person in authority, they still value that opportunity, 
even if such an opportunity occurs after a decision has been made. Next to participation, 
individuals faced with judicial proceedings place significant value on dignity (Tyler,
1996; Winnick, 1997). Indeed, Tyler (1996) notes that people “value the affirmation of 
their status by legal authorities as competent, equal, citizens and human beings, and they 
regard procedures as unfair if  they are not consistent with that affirmation. To understand 
the effects o f dignity, it is important to recognize that government has an important role 
in defining people’s views about their value in society. Such a self evaluation shapes 
one’s feelings of security and self-respect.”
The third element that impacts how people respond to contact with the judicial 
system is trust (Tyler, 1996). Essentially, people want to see some evidence that the 
authorities with whom they are interacting have a basic concern about their welfare, and 
have a desire to treat them fairly. According to Tyler (1996), “Trust is the most important 
quality, but also the most elusive, because it involves a motive attribution. In other words, 
people must infer whether an authority is or is not motivated to treat them fairly based on 
that authority’s actions.” Not surprisingly, that trust is influenced by participation and 
dignity. Tyler asserts that, “People regard authorities who allow them to present evidence 
as more trustworthy. Similarly, people regard authorities who treat them with dignity and 
respect as more trustworthy. Finally, the efforts of authorities to explain or account for 
decisions heighten judgments of trustworthiness.”
Tyler (1996) in Law in a Therapeutic Key: Developments in Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, while acknowledging the lack of direct research, summarizes the
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implications of the above elements of participation, dignity and trust as they apply to
commitment hearings.
The key question is what implications can be drawn from this literature regarding 
the therapeutic consequences of personal experiences with legal authorities. One 
implication is that people respond to how decisions are made—a response that is 
not simply linked to what decisions are. Hence, the psychological arena defined 
by the Supreme Court in cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly and Morrissey v. Brewer 
clearly exists.
Failure to receive due process has a number o f negative consequences for people 
who have personal experiences with legal authorities, including reluctance to 
accept decisions, diminished respect for the judge, mediator, or other third party, 
diminished respect for the courts and the legal system, and a diminished 
willingness to follow legal rules. These effects are completely consistent with the 
suggestion that experiencing arbitrary procedures leads to social malaise and 
decreases people’s willingness to be integrated into the policy, accepting its 
authorities and following its rules.
Of particular relevance to the question of therapeutic implications is the issue of 
behavior. Enhancing respect for authorities, the willingness to voluntarily accept 
the decisions of authorities and the willingness to follow social rules are core 
objectives of any therapeutic program. Hence, it seems likely that future studies of 
the therapeutic consequences of judicial hearings will demonstrate that 
commitment hearings experienced as unfair by those potentially being committed 
will have strongly antitherapeutic consequences (pgs 12-13).
Winnick, (1996) believes that therapeutic jurisprudence has the potential to mediate
some of the possible negative effects inherent in involuntary commitment hearings as
they are typically conducted presently. He says that, “Legal rules may produce negative
psychological or behavioral consequences. The effort to assess the negative
psychological and behavioral effects of legal rules and to suggest ways in which they
may be minimized can be seen as an exercise in therapeutic jurisprudence.”
Whether or not one believes therapeutic jurisprudence to be a viable reform of
mental health law, it nevertheless stands in dramatic contrast to the centuries-past
concern for the mentally ill. And regardless of whether one agrees with the reforms that
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civil libertarians and those who seek to protect access to care have achieved, one could 
hardly argue against the fact that the present state of mental health law is far superior to 
the days when the mentally ill had no rights or protection under the law. Nevertheless, it 
is important to remember that involuntary commitment severely restricts one of our most 
fundamental human rights, that o f freedom. Even so, it remains a highly protected issue 
that even the United States Supreme Court has been reticent to approach. Cornwell 
(1998) notes that;
In 1972, the Supreme Court noted that it was ‘remarkable’ given the number of 
individuals affected by involuntary civil commitment to mental hospitals, that ‘the 
substantive constitutional limits on these powers have not been more frequently 
litigated.’ Whereas judicial activity increased in the years that followed, the 
Supreme Court has remained hesitant to encroach upon the authority of state 
officials to determine substantive standards for commitment. This phenomenon is 
a function, perhaps, of the power that states have traditionally exercised over the 
management of mentally ill persons and of the Court’s concomitant recognition of 
the propriety of judicial deference to legislative determinations relating to the 
unsettled area of psychiatry (pgs 1-2).
Involuntarv Commitment Diagnoses and Tvpes of Treatment
And how many people are subject to involuntary commitment? In his 1981-1984
study of the Metropolitan Court in California (where civil commitments were held),
Holstein (1993) observed the workings of the court in this regard. According to his
observations, “ ...one temporary judge never granted a writ releasing a patient. In the
other jurisdictions, commitment hearings usually—but not always—resulted in
hospitalization; judges’ informal estimates of commitment rates ranged from 60 to 90
percent” (pg 33). Cornwell (1998) cites Supreme Court statistics from 1961 that indicate
that approximately 720,000 individuals judged mentally ill were, at that time,
involuntarily committed. More recent statistics point to an increase in that number. Isaac
and Brakel (1992) estimate that individuals civilly committed to psychiatric facilities for
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treatment is roughly 1.2 million per year. Thus, some million plus mentally ill people are 
appearing before United States judges who have the responsibility to determine whether 
treatment will be mandated by involuntary commitment, or whether they will retain their 
freedom to not be confined in a psychiatric facility.
The disorders and diagnoses associated with involuntary commitment can be found 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f  Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV), 
(American Psychological Association, 1994). Essentially, any mental disorder, when 
accompanied by the commitment criteria of dangerousness to self or others, or an ability 
to take care o f one’s own basic needs as a function of a mental illness, can qualify a 
person for civil commitment. Nevertheless, certain disorders are consistently associated 
with involuntary commitment. Categorically, five of the most common are delirium and 
dementia disorders; substance-related disorders; schizophrenia and other psychotic 
disorders; mood disorders and; personality disorders. According to the DSM-IV, there are 
specific symptoms that characterize mental disorders. Following, is a breakdown of the 
essential diagnostic features that typify the five aforementioned categories as directly 
extracted from the DSM-IV.
Delirium and Dementia Disorders
The essential feature o f a delirium is a disturbance of consciousness that is 
accompanied by a change in cognition that cannot be better accounted for by a 
preexisting or evolving dementia. The disturbance develops over a short period of time, 
usually hours to days and tends to fluctuate during the course o f the day. The disturbance 
in consciousness is manifested by a reduced clarity of awareness of the environment. The
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ability to focus, sustain or shift attention is impaired. Questions must be repeated because 
the individual’s attention wanders, or the individual may perseverate with an answer to a 
previous question rather than appropriately shift attention. There is an accompanying 
change in cognition (which may include memory impairment, disorientation, or language 
distur bance) or development o f a perceptual disturbance. Disorientation is usually 
manifested by the individual being disoriented to time or being disoriented to place. 
Perceptual disturbances may include misinterpretations, illusions, or hallucinations.
The essential feature of a dementia is the development of multiple cognitive deficits 
that include memory impairment and at lease one of the following cognitive disturbances: 
aphasia, apraxia, agnosia, or a disturbance in executive functioning. The cognitive 
deficits must be sufficiently severe to cause impairment in occupational or social 
functioning and must represent a decline from a previously higher level o f functioning. A 
diagnosis of a dementia should not be made if the cognitive deficits occur exclusively 
during the course of a delirium.
Memory impairment is required to make the diagnosis o f a dementia and is a 
prominent early symptom. Individuals with dementia become impaired in their ability to 
learn new material, or they forget previously learned material. Deterioration o f language 
function may be manifested by difficulty producing the names o f individuals and objects. 
Individuals with dementia may exhibit an impaired ability to execute motor activities 
despite intact motor abilities, sensory function, and comprehension of the required task. 
Further, they may be unable to recognize or identify objects despite intact sensory 
function. Impairment must be severe enough to cause significant impairment in social or 
occupational functioning and must represent a decline from a previous level of
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functioning. Dementia is not diagnosed if  these symptoms occur exclusively during the 
course of a delirium. However, a delirium may be superimposed on a persisting dementia, 
in which case both diagnoses can be given.
Substance -Related Disorders
Substance-related disorders include disorders related to the taking of a drug of abuse 
(including alcohol), to the side effects of a medication, and to toxin exposure. The term 
substance can refer to a drug o f abuse, a medication, or a toxin. Substances are grouped 
into 11 classes: alcohol; amphetamine or similarly acting sympathomimetics; caffeine; 
cannabis; cocaine; hallucinogens; inhalants; nicotine; opioids; phencyclidine (PCP) or 
similarly acting arylcyclohexylamines; and sedatives, hypnotics, or anxiolytics. Many 
prescribed and over-the-counter medications can also cause substance-related disorders. 
Symptoms are often related to the dosage of the medication and usually disappear when 
the dosage is lowered or the medication is stopped.
Substance-related disorders are divided into two groups: the Substance Use 
Disorders (Substance Dependence and Substance Abuse) and the Substance-Induced 
Disorders (Substance Intoxication, Substance Withdrawal, Substance-Induced Delirium, 
Substance-Induced Persisting Dementia, Substance-Induced Persisting Amnestic 
Disorder, Substance-Induced Psychotic Disorder, Substance-Induced Mood Disorder, 
Substance-Induced Anxiety Disorder, Substance-Induced Sexual Dysfunction, and 
Substance-Induced Sleep Disorder).
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Schizophrenia and Other Psychotic Disorders
The essential features of Schizophrenia are a mixture of characteristic signs and 
symptoms (both positive and negative) that have been present for a significant portion of 
time during a 1-month period (or for a shorter time if  successfully treated), with some 
signs o f the disorder persisting for at least 6 months. These signs and symptoms are 
associated with marked social or occupational dysfunction. The disturbance is not better 
accounted for by Schizoaffective Disorder or a Mood Disorder with psychotic features 
and is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance or a general medical 
condition.
The characteristic symptoms of Schizophrenia involve a range of cognitive and 
emotional dysfunctions that include perception, inferential thinking, language and 
communication, behavioral monitoring, affect, fluency and productivity of thought and 
speech, hedonic capacity, volition and drive, and attention. Characteristic symptoms may 
be conceptualized as falling into two broad categories—positive and negative. The 
positive symptoms appear to reflect an excess or distortion o f normal functions, whereas 
the negative symptoms appear to reflect a diminuation or loss of normal functions. The 
positive symptoms include distortions or exaggerations of inferential thinking 
(delusions), perception (hallucinations), language and communication (disorganized 
speech), and behavioral monitoring (grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior.
Mood Disorders
Mood Disorders include disorders that have a disturbance in mood as the 
predominant feature. They are divided into the Depressive Disorders (unipolar
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depression), the Bipolar Disorders, and two disorders based on etiology—Mood Disorder 
Due to a General Medical Condition and Substance-Induced Mood Disorder. The 
depressive Disorders (Major Depressive Disorder, Dysthymic Disorder, and Depressive 
Disorder Not Otherwise Specified) are distinguished from the Bipolar Disorders by the 
fact that there is no history of ever having had a Manic, Mixed, or Hypomanie Episode.
Major Depressive Disorder is characterized by one or more Major Depressive 
Episodes—at least 2 weeks of depressed mood or loss of interest accompanied by at least 
four additional symptoms of depression, such as irritability, excessive crying, suicidal 
ideation or attempt, or increased or decreased appetite. Dysthymic Disorder is 
characterized by at least 2 years of depressed mood for more days than not, accompanied 
by additional depressive symptoms that do not meet the criteria for Major Depressive 
Disorder. Bipolar Disorder is characterized by one or more manic or mixed episodes and 
usually accompanied by Major Depressive Episodes.
Personalitv Disorders
There are 11 personality disorders noted in the DSM-IV. They include. Paranoid 
Personality Disorder, where there is a pattern of distrust and suspiciousness such that 
others’ motives are interpreted as malevolent; Schizoid Personality Disorder, where there 
is a pattern of detachment from social relationships and a restricted range of emotion; 
Schizotypal Personality Disorder, wherein there is a pattern of acute discomfort in close 
relationships, cognitive or perceptual distortions, and eccentricities of behavior; 
Antisocial Personality Disorder, where there is a pattern of disregard for, and the 
violation of, the rights of others; Borderline Personality Disorder where there is a pattern
36
of instability in interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked 
impulsivity; Histrionic Personality Disorder, wherein there is a pattern of excessive 
emotionality and attention seeking; Narcissistic Personality Disorder where there is a 
pattern of grandiosity, need for admiration, and lack o f empathy; Avoidant Personality 
Disorder, wherein there is a pattern of social inhibition, feelings o f inadequacy, and 
hypersensitivity to negative evaluation; Dependent Personality Disorder, where there is a 
pattern of submissive and clinging behavior related to an excessive need to be taken care 
of; Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, wherein there is a pattern of preoccupation with 
orderliness, perfectionism, and control and: Personality Disorder Not Otherwise 
Specified, where the individuals personality pattern meets the general criteria for a 
personality disorder, but not all the criteria, or meets some of the criteria for more than 
one personality disorder.
Personality traits are enduring patterns o f perceiving, relating to, and thinking about 
the environment and oneself that are exhibited in a wide range of social and personal 
contexts. Only when personality traits are inflexible and maladaptive and cause 
significant functional impairment or subjective distress do they constitute a personality 
disorder. The essential feature o f a personality disorder is an enduring pattern of inner 
experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual’s 
culture and is manifested in at least two of the following areas: cognition, affectivity, 
interpersonal functioning, or impulse control. This enduring pattern is inflexible and 
pervasive across a broad range o f personal and social situations and leads to clinically 
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of 
functioning. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back to
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at least adolescence or early, and cannot be accounted for by another mental or medical 
disorder.
Typical Types of Treatment for Mental Disorders
As is the case with medical disorders, hosts of treatments exist for the treatment of 
mental disorders. Depending on the institution in which one is committed for treatment, 
and the theoretical positions of the treating staff, one could be offered, or unwillingly 
subjected to, a wide yariety o f treatments designed to impact the seyerity and course of a 
particular disorder. Bruce Winnick (1997) in The Right to Refuse Mental Health 
Treatment offers a detailed outline o f the types of treatment ayailable, their effectiyeness, 
and their potential side effects. A brief summary of the basic characteristics of 
psychotherapy, behayior therapy, psychotropic medication and electroconyulsiye therapy, 
describes the treatments typically ayailable (whether by choice or judicial mandate) to 
ciyilly committed indiyiduals.
Psychotherapy
According to Winnick (1997), “Psychotherapy is the generic term for any form of 
treatment based primarily upon yerbal or nonyerbal communication between a therapist 
and a patient in a structured professional relationship.” Indeed, there are many forms of 
psychotherapy that can be deliyered in either an indiyidual or group setting. In a general 
sense, psychotherapy attempts to mediate the symptoms of a wide range of psychological 
disorders within the context of the client-therapist relationship. Traditionally, 
psychotherapy “seeks to influence the attitudes of patients toward their illnesses, their
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own mental and physical processes, and their environment so that they may gain insight 
into the nature and cause o f  their problems” (Winnick, 1997).
With regard to the effectiveness o f  psychotherapy, as evidenced by empirical 
research, it is generally accepted that psychotherapy is beneficial. Partitioning out the 
change-inducing effects o f  psychotherapy remains a  challenge for social scientists. 
Nevertheless, certain characteristics or common factors have been isolated as 
fundamental to the process o f  change. Hubble, Duncan and M iller (1999), elaborating on 
the work o f Jerome Frank, and later M ichael Lambert, and using a w ide variety o f 
research designs estimated that client and extratherapeutic factors account for 40% o f  
outcome variance, with relationship factors accounting for 30% o f  outcome variance. 
Placebo, hope and expectancy accounted for 15% o f  the variance, and model and 
technique factors 15%.
Behavior Therapy
Winnick, (1997) describes behavior therapy as the “clinical application o f 
experimentally derived principles o f  psychological learning theory to teach adaptive 
behavior or modify maladaptive behavior by means o f  systematic manipulation o f  the 
patient’s environment.” He notes that behavior therapy is based on the principles o f 
learning and reinforcement as well as conditioning. Based primarily on the 
groundbreaking work o f  Pavlov, Skinner, Thorndike and others, behavior therapy seeks 
to change the contingencies whereby certain behaviors are reinforced. A n example o f  this 
is a  technique called a “token economy” wherein certain behaviors are “rewarded” and 
others “pimished.” W innick highlights the acceptance o f  behavior therapy as a viable
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form of treatment: “Evidence of its general acceptance and increasing influence can be 
found in the emergence since 1963 of at least 15 new research journals devoted to 
behavior therapy, the widespread availability of courses in behavior therapy in 
psychology doctoral programs, medical schools, and psychiatric residency programs; and 
the dramatic growth in government-funded research devoted to this rapidly developing 
field.”
Despite its popularity, Winnick (1997) is careful to note that behavior therapy can 
pose a potential for abuse. Indeed, “Token economies and tier systems, for example, 
sometimes make meals, a bed, toilet articles, outdoor exercise, writing and reading 
materials, religious services, and other basic personal requirements available contingent 
on the patient behaving in conformity with program goals.” Further, when one considers 
the hosts of individuals potentially responsible for implementing a behavior therapy 
regimen, the abuse or inappropriate use of behavior modification principles becomes a 
concern.
Psvchotropic Medication
The use of pharmacology for the treatment of mental disorders is founded in the 
medical model. Medicinal treatments for mental pathology seek to influence 
biological/physiological processes rather than psychological ones. The early development 
of antipsychotics and antidepressants came about largely as a result o f scientists noting 
the sedating or antidepressant effect of drugs prescribed for other medical problems. 
Early psychopharmacologic agents have been improved upon and, in many cases, the 
negative side effects of first generation antipsychotics and antidepressants have been
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dramatically reduced. Indeed, effective medicinal treatments exist for many 
psychological disorders without the long list o f debilitating side effects so common to 
their predecessors. Today, the use of antipsychotics, anxiolytics, tricyclic antidepressants, 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, monoamine oxidase inhibitors, and many more is 
quite common in the treatment of mental pathology. Nevertheless, as with most 
pharmacological agents, side effects still exist and the use of drugs to treat mental 
disorders is not without certain risks. Some of the drugs can cause fatal allergic reactions, 
debilitating blood and liver disorders, and even death. Still others have the potential to 
cause symptoms that, although non life-threatening, are both horrific and irreversible 
(Winnick, 1997).
Although these drugs are demonstrably effective, their use is often accompanied 
by toxic reactions and adverse side effects, some of which are quite serious and 
irreversible. Most o f the antipsychotic and antidepressant drugs produce a family 
of autonomic side effects, including blurred vision, dry mouth and throat, 
constipation, paralytic ileus, urinary retention, orthostatic hypotension, edema, 
tachycardia, palpitations, dizziness, faintness, drowsiness, fatigue, and inhibition 
of ejaculation.
The most common side effects o f the antipsychotic drugs are the extrapyramidal 
reactions, a family of bizarre disorders of the extrapyramidal motor system, 
consisting of a Parkinsonian syndrome, akathisia, dystonia, and dyskinesia. The 
Parkinsonian syndrome, closely resembling the symptoms of Parkinson’s disease, 
consists o f muscular rigidity, fine resting tremors, a masklike face, salivation, 
motor retardation, a shuffling gait, and pill-rolling hand movements. Akathisia is 
a feeling of motor restlessness or of a compelling need to be in constant motion in 
which the patient has difficulty remaining still and is driven to pace about 
impatiently and tap his foot incessantly. Dystonia involves bizarre muscular 
spasms, primarily o f the muscles of the head and neck, often accompanied by 
facial grimacing, involuntary spasm of the tongue and mouth interfering with 
speech and swallowing, oculogyric crisis marked by eyes flipping to the top of the 
head in a painftil upward gaze persisting for minutes or hours, convulsive 
movements o f the arms and head, bizarre gaits, and difficulty in walking. The 
dyskinesias present a broad range of bizarre tongue, face and neck movements. 
These extrapyramidal symptoms are subjectively quite stressfxil, may be 
incompatible with clinical improvement and with a useful life outside the hospital, 
and can be more unbearable than the symptoms for which the patients was
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originally treated. The psychotropic drugs, although efficacious in the treatment 
of many mental patients, thus present serious risks, particularly when 
involuntarily administered to institutionalized patients (pgs. 72-85) (Winnick,
1997).
Electroconvulsive Therapy
Another effective modality of treatment for certain mental disorders is 
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). ECT consists of placing electrodes on the temples of 
the receiving patient (while under general anesthesia) and passing low doses of electrical 
current through the brain. Such a procedure produces convulsions in the patient that 
resemble a grand mal seizure much like in epilepsy, except that the paralytic agents 
administered prevent the body from actually seizing. It is unclear, at this time, just why 
ECT is an effective treatment of certain mental disorders, the most notable of which is 
profound, treatment resistant depression. Nevertheless, ECT is accepted as an efficacious 
treatment for certain conditions (Winnick, 1997).
Unfortunately, there are specific risks and complications associated with ECT, even 
though they have been significantly reduced over time, as the treatment has been refined. 
Because of the use of muscle relaxants, some patients experience a temporary cessation 
of breathing, chest wall spasms, coughing, spasms of the larynx, cardiac irregularities, or 
allergic reactions to the drugs. The most serious and typical side effect of ECT is 
confusion and memory loss. Nearly all patients who receive ECT are confused following 
the procedure, and lack memory of the hours surrounding the procedure. Other patients 
experience longer-term memory loss that has been reported to last from several weeks to 
permanently. The exact amount of memory loss is frequently disputed, but an amount of 
retrograde and anterograde amnesia is almost always present following ECT. This
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memory loss may have a tendency to increase as the amount of ECT sessions (typically 
4-12 treatments) increases (Winnick, 1997).
The fact that so many effective treatments exist for those suffering from mental 
disorders is heartening, and offers hope to many. Nevertheless, as outlined above, 
psychological treatment is not without certain risks. Further, when one considers some of 
the potential consequences (or side effects) o f treatment for mental pathology, the fact 
that these treatments can be mandated on an involuntary basis, prudence dictates both 
caution, as well as strict adherence to the laws designed to protect the rights of the 
mentally ill who may be civilly committed to treatment. As such, judges who preside 
over involuntary commitment hearings have the ultimate responsibility of insuring the 
protection o f those rights.
Judges and Their Involuntarv Commitment Decisions
Prior to initiating the research at hand, a pilot study was conducted by the author in the 
state of Oklahoma to determine the extent o f training Oklahoma’s mental health judges 
had in abnormal psychology and mental health law. Further, the study investigated the 
judges’ conceptualizations o f the process o f civil commitment and their opinions as to the 
appropriateness of judges making involuntary commitment decisions, given their 
educational preparation (Poyner, 2000 unpublished). This survey study was broken down 
into the judges’ responses to questions from five related domains: 1) The importance of 
information sources (the mentally ill person’s presentation in court vs. a doctor’s 
statement) on decision-making; 2) Perceptions of adequacy of information on which 
decisions are made (treatment facility records); 3) Confidence in decision making, and
43
need for procedural changes; 4) Their general approach to commitment hearings (parens 
patriae or adherence to the law); and 5) Their educational preparation to make 
involuntary commitment decisions (how many courses taken in abnormal psychology and 
mental health law).
The results of that study showed positive correlations between the importance of 
information and the judges’ confidence in their decision-making, as well as between the 
importance o f information presented and the judges’ general approach to commitment 
proceedings. A multiple regression suggested that judges who have been practicing 
longer tend to weight the clinical presentation of the patient as more important in their 
decision-making than do those judges who have been practicing for fewer years. Results 
also suggested that many judges believe that they are insufficiently trained to make 
mental health decisions, that they continue to use a basically paternalistic (parens 
patriae—what is best for the person or society) style in decision-making, and that the 
involuntary commitment process is non-adversarial as it is practiced in their courtrooms.
Bursztajn, Gutheil, Mills, Hamm and Brodsky (1986) also conducted a study where 
judges’ commitment decisions were analyzed. They found that of 41 patients, the 
commitment rate was 83% (34 individuals). The judges in the study reported that their 
decisions were not difficult, and indicated that the three factors that most influenced their 
decisions were whether the psychiatrist’s opinion was convincing; whether the patient 
would be a reliable outpatient; and whether the patient was able to take care of him or 
herself. Other factors that were found to influence the judges’ decisions were the violence 
of the patient, the suicidality of patient, and the judges’ own opinions about the patient’s 
state.
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Many social scientists have studied the practice and process of involuntary 
commitment. One of those scientists wanted to determine the correlates of patient 
characteristics and commitment status (Nicholson, 1986). He looked at commitment 
studies that researched such individual characteristics such as age, gender, race, economic 
resources, marital resources and education. With regard to behavioral characteristics, 
Nicholson also included a quantitative review of studies that included previous treatment, 
danger to self, danger to others, severity of disorder, negative attitude and disruptive 
behavior in hospital. Nicholson found that committed patients were, on average, older, 
male, and nonwhite when compared to non-committed patients. Further, civilly 
committed individuals were less educated, and had fewer marital and economic resources 
than voluntary patients. Across the studies he evaluated, Nicholson also found that 
committed patients had more severe symptoms, received more serious diagnoses, and 
showed more dangerous behaviors than those who were voluntarily admitted.
Another researcher also investigated race as a factor that appears to play a part in 
involuntary commitment decisions (Rosenfield 1984). Specifically, she researched race 
and civil commitment. She analyzed data fi-om a random sample o f666 individuals who 
presented to a large New York City psychiatric emergency room. Using hospitalization 
vs. non-hospitalization and voluntary vs. involimtary as outcome criteria, Rosenfield 
found that whites and nonwhites did not differ in their likelihood for hospitalization. 
However, she found that nonwhites were significantly more likely than whites to be 
involuntarily hospitalized. Linsky (1968), in another study, also found that the ratio of 
involuntary to voluntary commitment is higher for nonwhites than it is for whites.
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Haney and Michielutte (1968) found very selective factors that combined to influence 
the adjudication of incompetency—often the forerunner to involuntary commitment. 
Indeed, this team found that older people were declared incompetent more often than 
young people, and that when psychiatrists comprised the committee for determination of 
incompetency, there were more determinations of the same. They also found that specific 
demographic analysis points to the determination of incompetency more often in urban, 
than in rural courts. Haney and Michielutte concluded that non-legal and non-medical 
factors often play a significant part in the incompetency and often subsequent involuntary 
commitment of mentally ill individuals.
Rushing (1971) also found that certain variables influence the rate o f involuntary vs. 
voluntary hospitalization. Occupation was found to be one factor that correlated more 
highly with involuntaiy, than voluntary, hospitalization for mental illness. Indeed, 
laborers were admitted to psychiatric services on an involuntaiy basis at almost twice the 
rate of voluntary admissions, whereas those in professional occupations were voluntarily 
and involuntarily admitted at essentially the same rate. Single people were also 
involuntarily admitted twice as often as voluntarily admitted, whereas married people 
were voluntarily admitted almost equally to involuntarily. Socioeconomic status played a 
part as well. The lowest socioeconomic group was involuntarily committed to treatment 
much more often than those of higher socioeconomic classes. The authors of this study 
concluded that, “a person’s social and economic resources and degree of community 
integration appear to be significant contingencies in the tendency to involuntarily 
hospitalize”(pg524).
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Surely, no one can dispute the fact that involuntary commitment decisions are both 
complex, and rife with political and societal implications. The decision to take away 
one’s freedom and liberty, however temporarily, caimot be made lightly. Prudence, 
therefore, would dictate that those tasked with decisions of such paramount importance 
would be highly prepared, both educationally and experientially. Unfortunately, such 
does not appear to be the case.
The judges in the author’s pilot study (Poyner, 2000 unpublished) reported that the 
number of courses they had taken in abnormal psychology ranged from 0-15, with a 
mean of 1.175, and a standard deviation of 2.50. In terms of the number of courses taken 
in mental health law, the judges ranged from 0-10, with a mean o f 1.214, and a standard 
deviation of 1.961.
It is also important to compare the low level of training in abnormal psychology and 
mental health law that the judges reported with their reported confidence (62%) that their 
decisions are legally sound. When one considers the complex nature of most mental 
illnesses, the question most salient here is how judges can determine that a person should 
be involuntarily committed to treatment, without specific training in mental health law, as 
well as the symptomotology, etiology, and predicted course attendant to a given mental 
disorder. Training in this area would seem crucial to effective, fair, and reasonable 
decision-making. One judge made the following notation on his survey, "....there should 
definitely be training forjudges in this area!” (Poyner, 2000 unpublished).
Another area of interest is the judges’ responses in the author’s pilot study (Poyner, 
2000 unpublished) concerning their likelihood to involuntarily commit mental health 
patients even when they do not present as a danger to themselves or others, or as unable
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to care for their basic needs, when the law stipulates those areas as the specific criteria for 
commitment. Over 50% of the judges indicated that they would be somewhat likely to 
extremely likely to involuntarily commit an individual even when their presentation 
pointed to an absence o f the criteria needed for commitment, if the doctor’s statement 
stated otherwise.
If a large proportion of judges are typically deferring to the doctor’s written statement, 
again, one has to question the purpose o f having mentally ill individuals appear before a 
judge. Additionally, as noted above, a good proportion of the judges (19%) noted that the 
doctor’s statement is extremely to somewhat unimportant to their decision-making. That 
combined with the judges (22.2%) who reported that the patient’s clinical presentation is 
somewhat or quite unimportant to their decision to commit, again begs the question of 
what rationale is being used for these important decisions.
The judicial system as a whole is noted for its adversarial process, and as such, it 
offers those who appear before a judge an attorney who will represent their interests. In 
the pilot study preceding this one, over 22% of the judges indicated that the involuntary 
commitment hearings carried out in their courtrooms are somewhat, quite, or extremely 
non-adversarial. These positions invite questions with regard to why mental health 
patients are not provided with the same adversarial processes as those citizens accused of 
crimes.
To truly protect the interests and rights of the mentally ill, an adversarial process 
should be deemed highly important, and necessary to the involuntary commitment 
process. Only judges are in a position to insure that the mentally ill individuals appearing 
in their courtrooms are assisted by attorneys who will genuinely represent them and
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advocate their position. In criminal trials, a lack of appropriate representation can be 
cause for a mistrial. In mental health hearings, however, there is no provision for such a 
safeguard. One judge offered his opinion about the premise that mental health hearings 
should be adversarial when he wrote, “This does seem to be an area of law that doesn’t 
quite fit in the adversarial system. I often find both attorneys trying to work toward what 
they each believe is in the best interest of the patient and or society, rather than their 
assigned responsibility.”
Other comments about the civil commitment process from the judges who responded 
to the pilot study included:
“I  fear tlxat the doctors have not evaluated the patient. Too many times, the patient 
has not seen the doctor, or i f  at all, only for a very short time. On some doctors, i f  the 
jury was not told who the doctor was, it would have a most difficult time determining 
which one needed treatment. "
“So called independent evaluations are more reflective o f  ease o f care, bed 
availability, and professionaljealousies as privatization balloons costs consuming 
limited resources. ”
“More input [is needed] from the doctors. Now all we get is a form with signature: no 
reasons, no facts at all. ”
“Certification reports are entirely conclusory—no stated rationale behind 
conclusions. Accepting the reports assumes both doctors did their job in evaluation. I  
know recommendations fo r  involuntary commitment are resource driven. ”
Other responses to the author’s study suggest that a “parens patriae” approach may 
still be in effect for a good portion o f the judges surveyed. With 42.8% of the responding
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judges indicating that, aside from legally m andated criteria for involuntary commitment, 
they still base their decisions on personal opinion about what is best for the patient, a 
strong “parens patriae” approach is suggested. This calls into question th e  progress we’ve 
made in reducing the paternalistic approach to involuntary commitment. Similarly, 
almost 40% o f  the judges noted that they base their decisions to involuntarily commit on 
personal opinion, aside from legal criteria, as it pertains to what is best fo r society. Again, 
this calls into question how far w e’ve come in better objectifying the process o f  civilly 
committing those who are suffering from mental illness.
Overwhelmingly, the judges surveyed in the author’s pilot study (90.5% ), believed 
that involuntary commitment decisions should continue to be made by judges. One judge 
offered her opinion o f this debate w hen she wrote, “I do not believe that psychiatrists 
should make commitment decisions. I have released patients against D r.’s 
recommendations because their conditions did not m eet statutory definitions. I have 
found that the D r.’s would let their feelings o f  w hat’s best for the patient m ore often 
interfere with statutory requirements than would judges.” Another judge offered an 
opposite opinion, “I believe judges and the court system are ill-equipped to m ake such 
decisions. [It] should be a doctor’s decision, with appeal rights.”
Another area that calls into question the judges’ overall satisfaction w ith the 
involuntary commitment process, is whether or not the judges feel the system  needs no 
change. The judge’s in the author’s study on average noted that they disagreed  that the 
involuntary commitment process needs no change. Distribution wise, 52.4%  o f  the judges 
disagreed with that premise. Overall, the judges were about equally divided about the
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process needing or not needing change. A summary o f  typical comments about the 
overall process included:
1. Doctors should improve their handwriting and use plain English.
2. Doctors should offer thoughtful diagnosis and treatment.
3. Doctors should give more input to the judges.
4. Time constraints on how quickly the hearings are held should be examined.
5. M ental health statutes should be less vague.
6. The option o f  a  jury trial should be eliminated. “Juries consistently commit. Judges 
do not.”
7. Department o f  M ental H ealth “bureaucrats” should not interfere with the process.
8. D octor’s should appear at hearings.
9. More resources are needed for both evaluation and treatment.
10. Treatment plans should be provided to the judges to aid in decision-making.
11. M echanisms need to be in place to insure rights are afforded to  patients.
12. The forms for involuntaiy commitment are poorly drafted.
13. There is a great need for long-term treatment. “We see the same people over and over 
again.”
14. Video conferencing from hospital to court may alleviate the patients’ fears about 
being in court.
A substantially high num ber o f  the judges in the author’s study (91% ) agreed that 
when they involuntarily commit a mental health patient, they are generally confident that 
the process has been carried out in such a  manner that the rights o f  the individual have 
been protected. However, one has to compare this finding with other responses, which
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suggest that many of the judges are using a paternalistic approach to involuntary 
commitment, that many of the judges find the process non-adversarial, and that the 
judges appear to be poorly trained in the areas of mental health law and abnormal 
psychology.
The above results prompted the current study and provided the impetus to discover
just how adequately judges are educationally prepared to make civil commitment
decisions and to cany out the statutory requirements of mental health law. To understand
the laws surrounding involuntary commitment, it would be prudent for the reader to be
familiar with what those laws entail. Following is a brief overview of Oklahoma’s Mental
Health Statute. The laws in most states typically mirror this example.
Oklahoma Mental Health Law
The Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services publishes and
disseminates the Emergency Detention Manual & Guidelines for the state of Oklahoma
(DMHSAS, 1997). The introduction of the manual sums up the purpose and intent of
Oklahoma’s mental health law as it applies to emergency detention.
The purpose of the Oklahoma Mental Health Law is to provide for the humane 
care and treatment of persons who are mentally ill or who require treatment for 
drug and alcohol abuse. All such residents of this state are entitled to medical care 
and treatment in accordance with the highest standards accepted in medical 
practice.
There are circumstances which justify the taking of an individual into protective 
custody for the purposes of initiating emergency detention proceedings. The 
emergency detention proceedings should be initiated only when there are no other 
acceptable alternatives for individuals who appear to be in need of treatment for 
mental illness or substance abuse. The emergency detention process is designed to 
ensure an individual receives appropriate treatment in addition to protecting the 
individual or other persons from dangers resulting from the mental illness or 
substance abuse.
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Protective custody and emergency detention are utilized as temporary measures 
for the speedy processing of emergency situations with the objective of 
suppressing and preventing conduct which is likely to create a clear and present 
danger to the individual or other persons. Emergency detention must not be 
utilized merely as a convenience to the parties involved in a particular situation. 
Under the police powers of the state, the right to initiate an emergency detention 
has been upheld by the courts. However, protective custody, emergency detention, 
and involuntary commitments deprive individuals of their liberty and should not 
be taken lightly. Therefore, constitutional due process is afforded to individuals 
subject to the emergency detention process. The due process includes, but is not 
limited to, the right to notice, the right to counsel, the right to jury trial, the right 
to be present in the hearing, the right to present and cross-examine witnesses, and 
the right to challenge detention through a habeas corpus action.
It is the responsibility of law enforcement, the judicial system (judges, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys), and mental health professionals to ensure that 
individuals falling within the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma mental health laws are 
afforded their constitutional and statutory rights (pg 7).
As with most legal documents, the laws that govern the judicial process afforded to
those who face involuntary detention are copious and extensively worded. Indeed, the
length of the document suggests that a great deal of thought and effort was put into
determining the best way to protect the rights of the mentally ill and remain in
compliance with state and federal law. Nonetheless, the basics of Oklahoma’s most
salient emergency detention laws, and the associated rights of those facing them, can be
briefly summarized by the following:
1. A person placed in protective custody must be examined by a licensed mental 
health professional within 12 hours of being taken into custody to determine if 
emergency detention is warranted.
2. If emergency detention is warranted, the licensed mental health professional 
shall prepare a statement describing the findings of the examination and 
stating the basis for the determination. The statement will be in the form 
provided by the Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services.
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3. The licensed mental health professional shall provide for a full examination 
and evaluation o f the person by two licensed mental health professionals.
4. A person may be detained in emergency detention more than 72 hours only if 
the facility is presented with a copy of an order of the district court 
authorizing further detention.
5. If a copy of an order for further detention is not delivered to the facility by the 
end of the period of emergency detention, the person requiring treatment shall 
be discharged unless said person has applied for voluntary treatment.
6. The person alleged to be mentally ill has the following rights: right to notice, 
right to counsel, right to a hearing, right to a jury trial if  requested, right to be 
present at the hearing or trial and the right to present and to cross-examine 
witnesses.
7. The attorney appointed by the court for persons who have no counsel shall 
meet and consult with person within one day of the notification of the 
appointment and shall present to the person their rights as stated by the 
Oklahoma and United States constitutions.
8. If the person is found at the hearing to be mentally ill and requiring treatment, 
the court will take evidence and make findings o f fact concerning the person’s 
competency to consent or to refuse the treatment that is ordered, including the 
right to refuse psychotropic medications.
9. The person delivering the copy of the notice and petition to the person alleged 
to be mentally ill shall, at the time of delivery, explain the content, purpose 
and effect o f the notice and the legal right to judicial review by habeas corpus.
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10. A copy of the notice and the petition shall be delivered at least one day prior 
to the hearing to; the individual initiating the request for protective custody; 
the attorney representing the alleged mentally ill person; the district attorney; 
the facility in which the person is detained; the Department of Mental Health 
and Substance Abuse Services; and a parent, spouse, guardian, brother, sister 
or child of the person alleged to be mentally ill who is at least 18 years of age 
and who did not initiate the petition.
11. The notice may be served personally or by certified mail.
12. The period of prehearing detention shall not exceed 72 hours, excluding 
weekends and holidays. Prehearing detention may be extended to coincide 
with any order of continuance entered by the court.
13. The court, at the hearing on the petition, shall determine by clear and 
convincing evidence whether the person is a mentally ill person and a person 
requiring treatment.
Are the Current Laws Reallv Practiced?
With the basics of Oklahoma’s emergency detention law outlined, it is time to turn to 
whether those laws, and others like them, are carried out—whether the spirit and the 
letter of the law coincide in any meaningful way. And that leads us to the question of 
whether the rights of the mentally ill truly are protected under the law as it is currently 
written and practiced, and whether judges are adequately prepared to make civil 
commitment decisions based on the statutory requirements of the law.
There are those who maintain that current judicial mandates adequately protect the 
rights of those mentally ill who have fallen under the purview of mental health law. In his
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paper on the subject, one sociologist stated; “Compulsory detention in a psychiatric 
hospital constrains, but does not remove the rights of those admitted. The mental health 
laws of different countries provide for various mechanisms intended to protect the rights 
o f detained patients” (Barnes, 1996). Others, even while acknowledging years of reform, 
disagree.
Berlin (2000) notes that the rights of the involuntarily committed individual may be
abrogated by many people in the process of civil commitment-even staff members of
inpatient psychiatric units.
 staff often view hospitalized patients who attempt to assert their constitutional
and statutory rights as trouble makers, and thus privilege quietly compliant 
patients and subordinate ‘difficult’ patients. This becomes even more important 
(and troubling) when considering the power that hospital staff frequently have 
over patients’ access to their counsel. If an institutionalized patient wants to 
contact counsel, she or he frequently must ask ward line-staff personnel to place 
the necessary telephone call. If, for whatever reason, the staff member determines 
that this is inappropriate, for example, if the patient is labeled a troublemaker— 
the promise of counsel becomes little more than a hoax (pg. 89)
Berlin, Gould and Derfman (1996) cite case law that found that the same “fundamental 
liberties” in criminal cases are at stake in civil commitment proceedings. And yet, the 
authors point out, “ ... .traditionally, involuntary civil commitment procedures have not 
assured the due process safeguards against unjustified deprivation of liberty that are 
accorded those accused o f a crime.” Moreover, they state that “For those with mental 
disabilities, there is a dearth of competent counsel.” Berlin et al. attributed this to 
ignorance of the law, fear of their clients, and feeling responsible for the acts of their 
clients. As a result, they note that attorneys do not “zealously” represent their mentally ill 
clients, and instead represent “what they—the attorneys and the advocates—feel is in the 
client’s best interest or in society’s best interest.”
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Such “best interest” representation is at the heart o f ‘"parens patriae’'—a legal power 
used by states to justify their decisions to involuntarily detain or commit mentally ill 
individuals. Some feel that the parens patriae power is broadly used to also label the 
mentally ill as when, in the process of civil commitment, individuals are labeled 
incompetent. Winnick (1996) advocates a more limited use of parens patriae in the area 
of competency. “The adverse effects of incompetency labeling are sufficiently serious 
that in many contexts, application of the label should be regarded as a deprivation of 
liberty within the meaning of the Constitution. As a result, in such contexts, the state’s 
ability to use its parens patriae power, which requires labeling an individual incompetent, 
should be limited. In these contexts, constitutional considerations suggest that 
incompetency should be defined more narrowly, that competency should be presumed, 
and that the burden of persuasion should be placed on the party that asserts 
incompetency.”
James Holstein (1993) extensively researched the process of involuntary commitment.
Indeed, from 1981-1984 he was a physical presence at the Metropolitan Court in
California, observing and taking notes on the process of civil commitment. With regard
to adherence to statutory mandates, he writes of his experience:
While the law states that the treating psychiatrist must offer testimony regarding 
the patient’s mental condition, this is often not the case in Metropolitan Court. 
Most of the persons filing writs were held in large local psychiatric facilities and 
several might have hearings in Metropolitan Court each day. If the law were to be 
strictly observed, each patient’s treating psychiatrist would have to accompany 
the patient to court, and might spend the entire day waiting for the case to be 
called. Consequently, staff psychiatrists at the facilities typically agreed among 
themselves to testify in hearings involving patients for whom they were not the 
treating psychiatrists, thus limiting the number who had to go to court, and 
preserving the clinical schedules at their institutions.
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The testifying doctors had access to patient records and may have been familiar 
with the patients, their diagnoses, and treatment histories and plans before the day 
o f their court appearances. At minimum they would review the psychiatric 
records, and attempt to briefly interview the patient, often in the halls of the court 
building itself. The PD’s [Public Defender’s] office stipulated that the presence of 
treating psychiatrists could be waived in order to allow the psychiatric facilities to 
remain adequately staffed. Thus, the proceedings at Metropolitan court might 
involve a single psychiatrist from the state hospital, for example, who would 
testify in the hearings of several patients—none o f whom might actually be under 
his or her care (pg 32).
Indeed, Holstein quotes Warren (1982) as suggesting that, “commitment hearings are
public occasions where justice is ‘seen to be done’” (pg 42).
Other researchers cite problems with the implementation of current involuntary
commitment laws. Husted and Nehemkis (1995) studied civil commitment from the
perspectives of police, professionals, and families and found that “there is a difference in
the subjective understanding of the criteria as delineated in the law. This is demonstrated
by the fact that the two main groups who are responsible for initial implementation of the
laws—emergency room mental health staff and police officers in the community,
significantly disagree on when these laws may be applied.”
Others note that even when it is clear that the law needs to be applied, it may be done
so in the direction of commitment, but not in the direction o f protecting the rights of
those being committed. Osuna, Cuenca, Perez-Carceles and Luna (1995) addressed the
legal status of the chronically ill and noted that “The spirit o f the current legislative
framework is to protect persons with mental illness and to guarantee each and every one
of their rights. However, it should be recognized that promulgation of a new law is not
tantamount to its enforcement.”
Appelbaum (1997) in Almost a Revolution: An International Perspective on the Law
o f  Involimtary Commitment, took an international look at involuntary commitment laws
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and said that, “The key to understanding the difference between commitment law on the 
books and commitment law  in practice is to recognize that laws are not self-enforcing. 
Indeed, implementation o f  involuntary hospitalization is delegated to a  variety o f  
participants in the com m itm ent process, all o f  whom have the potential to affect how the 
law is applied. W hen the results o f  a  law narrowly applied will be contrary to the moral 
intuitions o f  these parties, they will act at the margins to modify the law in practice to 
achieve what seem to them  to  be more reasonable outcomes” (pg 142).
Applebaum’s (1997) contentions are supported by several pertinent studies. In one 
study, even though the very narrow terms o f  California’s commitment law were not met, 
W arren (1982) found that one judge applied “commonsense notions to his decisions.” In 
another study Hiday and Sm ith (1987) found that “in 47.5%  o f  commitment cases in 
which the petition lacked any information concerning the statutory dangerousness 
criteria, respondents were com m itted anyway.” Applebaum (1997) contends that failure 
to abide by comm itm ent laws is also a problem for attorneys who represent the mentally 
ill. Indeed, Poythress (1978) who trained lawyers in challenging expert testimony at 
commitment hearings, found that “none o f  them  used the training, because they did not 
see it as their job  to achieve the release o f  people whom they viewed as genuinely ill.” 
Other studies have had sim ilar findings. W arren (1982) found that attorneys “were not 
often playing the adversarial role anticipated by the law.” Bottomley (1987), found that
“many lawyers elect to argue for their version o f  patients’ needs rather than for
patients’ expressed wishes to  be released. Lawyers’ presence does not guarantee an 
adversarial proceeding.”
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Applebaum (1997) notes that the problem does not just rest with legal participants. 
“With judges and lawyers who are trained to be respectful of individual rights bending 
the law when that seems to be necessary for patients to receive treatment, it is no surprise 
that psychiatrists, whose primary interest is in providing treatment, do the same. Reviews 
of commitment petitions completed by psychiatrists and other mental heath professionals 
routinely reveal a failure to specify legally required criteria in a large percentage of cases; 
16.1% in a North Carolina study of cases that led to judicial commitment; even higher 
numbers in a set o f Canadian studies” (Hiday & Smith, 1987; McCready & Merskey;
Page & Yates 1973, as cited by Applebaum).
Rubin, Snapp, Panzano and Taynor (1996) found that there are many factors which 
influence the implementation of mental health law, and that these factors may vary within 
individual states operating under the same legal code. Some of the factors include: 
judges’ interpretations o f the legal code; clinicians’ attitudes about involuntary treatment; 
judges’ attitudes about outpatient commitment as an alternative to involuntary 
hospitalization; service providers’ liability concerns; the organizational structure of the 
local mental health delivery system; attorneys’ assumptions of adversarial versus 
paternalistic positions in the courtroom; law enforcement officials’ levels of cooperation; 
and the communities’ demographic characteristics.
Bursztajn, Hamm and Gutheil (1997) have also looked at which factors influence the 
implementation o f civil commitment laws. In a single case study o f a judge’s decision 
process and concomitant implementation of the law surrounding civil commitment, it was 
found that the judge considered factors not directly specified by the law. “Among the 
specific factors this judge used in considering whether the law’s general principles
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applied in each case, were the patient’s competence, predictability, and reliability as an 
outpatient, as well as whether family and friends favor commitment.”
Certainly, the medico-legal decision to involuntarily commit a person to treatment is 
not an easy one. Anderson and Eppard (1995) studied psychiatrists, nurses and counselors 
with regard to clinical decision making during assessment for involuntaiy psychiatric 
admission and identified nine structural elements; “The process of clinical decision 
making for involuntary psychiatric admission is systematic, cautious, and individualized. 
It is important to connect with the client and use intuitive reasoning. State-mandated 
criteria must be met, and treatment alternatives considered. All contingencies cannot be 
controlled. The decision to involuntarily admit a patient is never made alone.” The 
preceding criteria appear to meld well with both the spirit and the letter of our current 
laws, which mandate a thorough, well-documented process that includes procedural 
safeguards to protect the rights of those most intimately affected by commitment 
decisions. Eriksson and Estrin (1995) though, found that the patients they surveyed felt a 
sense of “fait accompli” with regard to the coercive measures involved in the 
commitment process. Indeed, 51% of the surveyed patients who were committed reported 
that “they had been violated as a person/human being.”
Oklahoma, like many other states, has seen lawsuits related to issues surrounding the 
detention of the mentally ill. One such lawsuit was explored in the Opinions o f  the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court (1997), and is officially known as Wofford vs. Mental Health 
Services, Inc. Court records show that Dawn Wofford was feeling suicidal on the night 
of October 29,1990, and subsequently voluntarily admitted herself to Parkside Hospital. 
Earlier in the evening she had been refused admission at another hospital because o f a
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lack o f  insurance. As part o f  the admission process at Parkside, Mrs. W offord signed a
consent form that stipulated the conditions o f  her voluntary discharge from the hospital.
Her signature acknowledged that to be released, she would be required to submit a
written request to the administrator and the medical director o f  the hospital, and that the
hospital would be allowed to hold her for only 3 days after her written request.
Approximately 12 hours after her admission, Ms. W offord requested, in writing,
that she be released from Parkside Hospital. On November 2 ,1 9 9 0 ,4  days after her
admission, an order allowing Parkside to detain Ms. W offord was filed with the court.
Mrs. W offord responded by filing a w rit o f  habeus corpus, after which the hospital
released her. When one examines the dates o f  Ms. W offord’s entrance and exit from
Parkside, it is apparent that the hospital held her for only one day past the mandatory 3
days stipulated in the consent form she signed. Nevertheless, a lawsuit for false
imprisonment was filed and ultimately won by Mrs. Wofford. Due to  procedural problems
involving the various judges who heard the 5-year long case, the verdict was later
overturned on appeals. However, a t the conclusion o f  the appeals trial, and after the jury
was discharged, one o f  the Supreme Court judges hearing the case m ade the following
statement to  the assembled plaintiff and defendants;
I think that what you did to  this woman was absolutely outrageous and a  disgrace 
to your system and a  disgrace to my system. This hospital had no authority to 
keep this woman, mentally ill or not, without following court procedures, good 
intentions or not. And I think th a fs  outrageous. And I hope you know, I certainly 
respect this ju ry ’s verdict, but I hope, because you walk out o f  here Scott Free, 
that you don’t take that as a license to continue to falsely imprison people like 
Mrs. Wofford. I am absolutely appalled. And, again, I have som e faith that you 
will do whatever you need to  do to straighten that out (pg 2).
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Anecdotal Observations
As a former Intake Coordinator, the author of this research has worked extensively 
with the mentally ill in two inpatient facilities. For 2 years, she took part in the process of 
civilly committing adult mental health patients to treatment. In a professional capacity 
she was responsible for assisting doctors in preparing legal documents for commitment, 
delivering the notarized documents to court, advising patients of their legal rights, and 
accompanying them to and observing many of their hearings.
Those professional experiences allowed her to become very familiar with the mental 
health laws as they exist and are practiced at one mental health facility in one county in 
the state of Oklahoma. As a result, the opinion was formed that, although current mental 
health law was designed to carefully protect the rights of mentally ill individuals, the 
letter of the law and its practice do not coincide in such a way as to fulfill the purpose and 
intent of the law. Anecdotal observations point to several deficiencies with regards to 
how the rights of the mentally ill were carried out. Most notably they included;
1. Examination of the mentally ill was often carried out by only one licensed mental 
health professional, instead of the two dictated by law. The second physician signing 
the emergency detention paperwork rarely ever saw the patient.
2. Examinations were often completed by medical residents who had not yet completed 
their psychiatric rotations.
3. Sections o f the legal, notarized paperwork were often filled in by those other than 
licensed mental health professionals. Often sections were left blank and/or did not 
give the information requested by the court.
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4. Judges appeared to trust that the examinations of the mentally ill and the attendant 
paperwork had been completed as mandated by law, and made decisions based on 
those assumptions.
5. When patients did not appear to meet the criteria of dangerousness to self or others, or 
as being unable to care for their own basic needs, judges often ordered involuntary 
commitment anyway.
6. When patients’ presentations were contrary to what the physician’s statement 
outlined, the statement was generally considered more relevant.
7. The adversarial process dictated by law was not present in the involuntary 
commitment hearings.
8. The mentally ill were often not informed of their rights by the public defender or the 
court, and a member of the family was never notified, as specified by law.
Such observations led to the authors interest in the rights of the mentally ill, the 
process of civil commitment, and the part judges play in insuring that the process is 
carried out fairly and as mandated by law. The study at hand followed as a consequence, 
and produced the following hypotheses; 1) Less than 50% of ABA and AALS accredited 
law schools would offer training in mental health law and abnormal psychology; 2)
Those who did offer training in these two areas would do so on an elective basis and; 3) 
There would be a need for recommendations regarding judicial preparation for 
conducting involuntary commitment hearings.
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CHAPTER m  
METHOD
Participants and Procedures
Because judges are central to the process of involuntarily committing their citizenry, 
and because they are specifically tasked with ultimately ensuring that the constitutional 
and statutory rights of those who fall under their jurisdiction are protected, their 
educational preparation for involuntary commitment hearings is very salient. Because 
their judgments should be based on the strict statutes of mental health law as well as a 
fundamental understanding of abnormal psychology, their preparation to ultimately 
integrate the same was seen as important.
One-hundred-eighty-five research packets were mailed to the Deans of Academic 
Affairs at all ABA (American Bar Association) and AALS (American Association of 
Law Schools) accredited law schools in the United States and U.S. Territories. Their 
names and addresses were secured from the ABA and AALS. The research packets 
included a cover letter, the 2-page survey instrument and a postage-paid envelope to 
return their responses. A second mailing went out approximately 6-weeks after the first 
mailing and included the research packet and a reminder letter. The study was conducted 
during the Fall of 2000 under the auspices o f the University of Oklahoma, Educational 
Psychology Department. The cover letter and survey questions used in this study are 
included at the end of this paper.
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Instruments
The research instrument covered institutional variables such as public or private 
status; the number o f students enrolled in the university and in the law program; the 
type(s) o f degree(s) offered; the number of full and part-time faculty; information related 
to coursework, seminars, clinical practica or any training related to mental health law and 
abnormal psychology; the actual courses offered; the training emphasis on types of law; 
the importance placed by the institution on training in mental health law and abnormal 
psychology; specifics that are covered in any coursework offered in the areas of mental 
health law and abnormal psychology; the Deans’ opinions as to whether judges should 
continue to make involuntary commitment decisions; and a comments section.
Specifically, the questions covered on the instrument centered on whether the law 
school offers coursework, seminars, clinical practica, or any relevant training in the areas 
of abnormal psychology and mental health law. The deans were asked to include the titles 
of any courses available in these areas. The deans were also asked to rate, on a 6-point 
Likert scale) the importance they place on training in abnormal psychology and mental 
health law. Lastly, the deans were given checklists of topics specific to basic instruction 
in abnormal psychology and mental health law. They were asked to check those topics 
covered in any of the instruction offered in the two target areas.
Data Analvsis
SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) was used to analyze the data. 
Analyses for this exploratory study were largely descriptive statistics used to describe the 
current state of judicial training in the areas of mental health law and abnormal 
psychology. Correlations were run on institutional variables and the number of courses
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offered in mental health law and abnormal psychology, as well as on institutional 
variables and the importance placed on training in these areas by the law schools. T-tests 
were run to determine if there were any significant differences between public and 
private law schools and the number of courses they offer in mental health law and 
abnormal psychology; to determine if  there were any significant differences between the 
number of courses offered by institutions that offer only the J.D. and those that offer the 
J.D. and other degrees; and to determine if there were any significant differences between 
public and private institutions regarding the importance they place on training in mental 




Of the 185 research packets mailed, a total of 109 Deans of Academic Affairs 
responded with completed surveys. The total number o f ABA and AALS schools 
included in the study was reduced to 184 after the Department of the Navy’s Judge 
Advocate General’s office wrote to say that involuntary commitment does not come 
under their purview in the Armed Forces. Thus, the response rate to this survey was 59%.
The sample in this study was ultimately comprised of more deans from private law 
schools (62) than deans from public law schools (47). The majority of the schools offered 
only a J.D. (Juris Doctorate) (70), with the remaining offering the J.D. as well as other 
related law degrees. The average number of full-time faculty was 37, and ranged from 
15-101. The average number o f part-time faculty was 42, ranging from 0-250. The 
average school size was between 10,000 and 17,000 students, and ranged from under 
5,000 to 80,000 or greater. The average size of the actual law school in the surveyed 
institutions was 685, and ranged from 140 to 1,800 students.
The results of this study can be best explained in descriptive statistics that point to the 
frequencies and measures of central tendency associated with the data. Nevertheless, 
correlations and t-tests were also run to further explain the results. Unfortunately, due to a 
general lack of correlated variables, the data did not lend itself to regression analysis. 
Indeed, even though many o f the variables were dichotomous, and could have been
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submitted to  a logistic regression, the correlations were not present to support that type o f 
analysis.
Correlations were run on the number o f  courses offered in mental health law or 
abnormal psychology, the number o f students enrolled in the institution and in the law 
school, the number o f  full and part-time faculty, and the importance placed by the Deans 




Correlations o f  Institutional Variables and Emphasis Placed on Training
CO U R SES NUMINSTI NUMSTUD FULLFAC PARTFAC IMPMHL IMPABPSY
CO U RSES P earso n 1.000 .057 .126 .167 .110 **.386 .171
Sig. .559 .206 .085 .272 .000 .102
N 109 106 103 107 101 98 93
NUMINSTI P ea rso n .057 1.000 .009 .125 -.141 .062 .023
Sig. .559 .929 .208 .167 .551 .827
N 106 106 100 104 98 95 90
NUMSTUD P earso n .126 .009 1.000 **.797 **.727 .058 -.051
Sig. .206 .929 .000 .000 .579 .635
N 103 100 103 101 96 94 90
FULLFAC P earso n .167 .125 **.797 1.000 **.626 .023 .091
Sig. .085 .208 .000 .000 .824 .391
N 107 104 101 107 101 96 91
PARTFAC P earso n .110 -.141 **.727 **.626 1.000 .070 -.079
Sig. .272 .167 .000 .000 .510 .472
N 101 98 96 101 101 91 86
IMPMHL P earso n **.386 .062 .058 .023 .070 1.000 **.614
Sig. .000 .551 .579 .824 .510 .000
N 98 95 94 96 91 98 93
IMPABPSY P earso n .171 .023 -.051 .091 -.079 **.614 1.000
Sig. .102 .827 .635 .391 .472 .000
N 93 90 90 91 86 93 93
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
COURSES = # of courses offered in mental health law and/or abnormal psychology
NUMINSTI = # of students enrolled in the institution
NUMSTUD = # of students enrolled in the law school
FULLFAC/PARTFAC = # of full and part-time faculty at the institution 
IMPMHL/IMPABPSY = importance placed on training in mental health law and abnormal
psychology
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As the above table shows, the only significant correlations (other than number of full 
and part-time faculty) were found in the self-evident positive relationship between the 
number of courses offered in mental health law/abnormal psychology and the emphasis 
placed on training in mental health law, as well as in the positive relationship between the 
importance of training in mental health law and the importance of training in abnormal 
psychology. 
t-Tests
Three independent samples t-tests were run on the data. The first t-test looked for 
significant differences between public and private institutions and the number of courses 
in mental health law and/or abnormal psychology offered. No significant differences 
were found. The same outcome resulted from the second t-test, which looked for 
significant differences between institutions that offered only a J.D. and institutions that 
offered a J.D. as well as other degrees. The third t-test looked for significant differences 
between public and private institutions and the importance each placed on training in 
mental health law, and the importance each placed on training in abnormal psychology. 
Again, there were no significant differences.
Descriptive Statistics
As noted above, the data gleaned from this study lends itself primarily to descriptive 
statistics. Indeed, the descriptive statistics run on the data yielded much in the way of 
information about law schools and the preparation they offer future judges with regard to 
training in mental health law and abnormal psychology.
Table 2 delineates the institutional variables, measures o f central tendency, and 
frequencies of responses. Variables include the public or private designation of the
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institution; the type o f degree offered at the institution (J.D. only, or J.D. and other 
degrees); the numbers o f  full and part-time faculty; the size o f  the total student 
population; and the size o f  the law school population.
Table 2.
Measures o f  Central Tendency and Frequencies for Institutional Variables
Variable M ean Median Mode Range %  Frequency
Public Institution - - - - 43 (47)
Private Institution - - - - 57 (62)
J.D. Degree Only - - - - 64 (70)
J.D. & Other - - - - 36 (39)
Fulltime Faculty 37 35 30 15-101 - -
Part-time Faculty 42 30 30 0-250 - -
School Size 10,000- 10,000- under under 5,000- - -
15,000 15,000 5,000 80,000 o r>
Law School Size 685 650 650 140-1,800 - -
W ith regard to the deans’ responses about offering any practica, seminars or 
coursework in mental health law, 65% (71) o f the deans indicated that they offered some 
training, and 35% (38) indicated that they offered none (N = 109). Only 106 deans 
responded to the question o f  whether they offered practica, seminars or coursework in 
abnormal psychology, with 14% (15) indicating yes, and 85% (91) indicating no. The 
m ean o f actual coursework for mental health law and abnormal psychology was 1 course, 
w ith the number o f courses ranging from o f 0-6. Forty percent (44) o f the deans indicated 
that they offer no coursework in mental health law or abnormal psychology, 43% (47) 
indicated that they offer 1 or 2 courses, 15% (17) indicated that they offer 3 or 4 courses, 
and 1% (1) indicated that they offer 6 courses (total N =  109).
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Tables 3 and 4 summarize the data with regard to the importance the responding deans 
indicated that they place on training in mental health law and abnormal psychology.
Table 3.
Importance the Law School Places on Training in Mental Health Law
Response Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative %
Extremely Unimportant 4 3.7 4.1 4.1
Quite Unimportant 17 15.6 17.3 21.4
Somewhat Unimportant 21 19.3 21.4 42.9
Somewhat Important 49 45.0 50.0 92.9
Quite Important 7 6.4 7.1 100.00
N 98 89.9 100.0
Missing II 10.1
Table 4.
Importance the Law School Places on Training in Abnormal Psychology
Response Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative %
Extremely Unimportant 19 17.4 20.4 20.4
Quite Unimportant 24 22.0 25.8 46.2
Somewhat Unimportant 28 25.7 30.1 76.3
Somewhat Important 21 19.3 22.6 98.9
Quite Important 1 .9 1.1 100.0
N 93 85.3 100.0
Missing 11 14.7
Tables 5 and 6 outline the specifics covered in the responding law schools’ 
coursework, seminars or practica regarding mental health law and abnormal psychology. 
Each presents a breakdown of many of the fimdamentals essential to basic knowledge in 




Specifics Covered in the Instruction of Mental Health Law
Topic # of law schools offering specific
training in mental health law
1. Mental health law of their state 37
2. General overview of mental health law 55
3. Dangerousness to self 49
4. Dangerousness to others 49
5. Unable to care for self due to mental illness 39
6. Emergency detention 45
7. Involuntary commitment 54
8. Adversarial representation of the mentally ill 43
9. Court commitment paperwork 19
10.Decision-making process for commitment 42
11 .Least restrictive treatment 43
12.Rights of the mentally ill 54
13.Parens patriae 37
14. Other 12
With regard to the deans’ beliefs about whether involuntary commitment decisions 
should continue to be made by judges, only 71 deans responded to this particular 
question. In nearly every case, the deans believed that involuntary commitment decisions 
should continue to be made by judges. One dean wrote that, yes, involuntary commitment 
decisions should continue to be made by judges, but that they should be “in consultation 
with health care professionals.” Another judge wrote “Maybe—[it’s a] complicated issue 
and judges may be [the] best of not so great alternatives.” Only one (1%) of the 
responding deans indicated that judges should not continue to make involuntary 
commitment decisions. Many of the deans left this question imanswered. Of the few who
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did not indicate yes or leave the question blank, they wrote, “I don’t know” and “No 
opinion.”
Table 6.
Specifics Covered in the Instruction of Abnormal Psychology
Topic # of law schools offering specific 
training in abnormal psychology
1. DSM-rV 8
2. Mental Retardation/Developmental Disorders 6
3. Cognitive Disorders 7
4. Mental Disorders Due to a Medical Condition 4
5. Substance-Related Disorders 5
6. Schizophrenia/Psychotic Disorders 7
7. Mood Disorders 6
8. Somatoform Disorders 1
9. Impulse-Control Disorders 2
10.Personality Disorders 7







18. Assessment Methods 5
19. Sleep Disorders 1
20.Treatment Modalities 5
Nevertheless, those deans that offered comments provided another perspective about 
the preparation judges have for carrying out fair and legally sound involuntary 
commitment hearings. Their comments included:
“There should be more [attorneys trained in mental health law and abnormal 
psychology]. ”
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“I  wish that we exposed students to more in this area. At present a psychiatrist 
makes one to two presentations per semester to students in the clinic. ”
“We ought to do more. We offer almost none. ”
“We do not offer these two courses. I f  the student wishes, the Vice Chancellor will 
allow our law students to take a graduate course on [another] campus i f  it will help with 
the student's future. ”
“[I] think more [education] would be useful. ’’
“This area is important, but we only cover it through other classes: criminal, 
estates and trusts, elder law, etc. "
“Cross-disciplinary training and education o f law students is essential. Direct 
exposure to mental health consumers has provided, in the words o f  one student, 'the best 
experience I've had in law school. ’ Clinical training in mental health law should be 
encouraged. "
“We do not have any course that deals directly and explicitly with abnormal 
psychology. Aspects o f abnormal psychology are addressed in other courses, including 
mental health law and criminal law.... ”
“Our failure to take seriously mental disability law as a law school sub]ect is 
shameful. [I] believe that it is, in large part, due to the way we—law schools and the rest 





Hypotheses and Research Questions
Overall, the information gleaned from this study provides an interesting and 
informative look at the preparatory coursework and training future mental health judges 
receive in the areas o f  mental health law and abnormal psychology. Further, the 
responses from the Deans o f Academic Affairs from 109 ABA and AALS accredited law 
schools offer a unique look into the importance law school administrators place on 
training in mental health law and abnormal psychology.
Three hypotheses served as a  foundation to this research. Namely, that less than 50% 
o f ABA and AALS accredited law schools would offer training in mental health law and 
abnormal psychology; that those who did offer training in these two areas, would do so 
on an elective basis; and that there would be a need for recommendations regarding 
judicial preparation for conducting involuntary commitment hearings.
The first hypothesis was not borne out in one aspect o f  this study. Indeed, o f  the 109 
responding law schools, 65% o f  the deans o f  academic affairs indicated that they offer 
some form  (seminars, practica, or coursework ) o f  training in m ental health law, well over 
the 50% mark set by the researcher. However, o f  the 106 deans who responded to the 
question as to w hether they offer any training in abnormal psychology only 14% 
answered in the affirmative, generously confirming that portion o f  the research 
hypothesis. Further, it should be noted that when the deans were asked to specify the
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number o f actual courses (not practica or seminars), the mean number of courses offered 
was 1, with 1 also being the median, and 0 being the mode. The total number of courses 
offered ranged from 0-6. Indeed, 40% (44) o f the 109 responding law schools offer no 
coursework in mental health law and abnormal psychology. Another 43% (47) offer only 
1-2 courses, and 15% and 1% offer 3-4 and 6 courses respectively. And lastly, of those 
law schools offering some form of training (seminars, practica or coursework) only 2% 
(2) required coursework in mental health law or abnormal psychology. The majority of 
the responding deans indicated that such training would be elective. Such outcomes tend 
to support the hypothesis that training in these areas is not a priority. Further, the results 
call into question how adequately prepared judges are to make involuntary commitment 
decisions.
Other results point to similar conclusions and questions. With the responding deans 
indicating that the importance placed on training in mental health law (39% extremely 
unimportant to somewhat unimportant) and abnormal psychology (65% extremely 
unimportant to somewhat unimportant) one can easily come to the conclusion that 
training in this area, even when offered, may be cursory or only minimally stressed. 
Indeed, only 6% and 1% of the deans noted that that training in mental health law and 
abnormal psychology respectively is quite important.
Given that individuals facing involuntary commitment will be deprived of their 
freedom, and may even be forced to take psychotropic medications, or submit to 
treatments such as ECT, such results are disappointing, if  not frightening.
One would hope that the individuals tasked with such potentially life-altering 
decisions would be well-prepared to carry out such sensitive responsibilities. But as the
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results of this study show, not only are judges not educationally prepared on a basic and 
fundamental level to make involuntary commitment decisions, they are often even less 
prepared when the education pertains to the specifics of understanding the mentally ill 
and the laws that pertain to their presence in a courtroom (see Tables 6 and 7).
Indeed, of those deans o f academic affairs who indicated that they offer some form of 
training (practica, seminars or coursework) in mental health law, 70 indicated that they 
do not cover in their instruction the mental health law of their own state. The numbers for 
those schools offering some form of training in abnormal psychology were even less 
encouraging. Indeed, of the 108 who responded to the questions regarding specifics 
covered in their instruction, only 6 covered mood disorders in their instruction, and only 
5 covered schizophrenia and psychotic disorders, two of the most common reasons for 
involuntarily committing mentally ill individuals.
Once again, the question must be asked—without training in mental health law, how 
can judges implement its statutory requirements? Without training in abnormal 
psychology, how can judges recognize when individuals meet the strict criteria for civil 
commitment of dangerousness to self or others, or of an inability to care for their basic 
needs as a function of their mental illness? Certainly the distinction between a person 
with delusions of grandeur who thinks he should be president of the United States, and a 
person with persecutory delusions who believes the president of is after him and so must 
be assassinated, could make the difference between meeting or not meeting the statutoiy 
requirements o f dangerousness.
If, however, judges are not trained to distinguish between unusual, even abnormal— 
but not dangerous- behavior, and behavior that portends danger, they may be likely to
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take away a person’s freedom, and thereby force treatment, based simply on the oddity o f 
the person’s behavior, and not on their potential for dangerousness to self or others. That 
type o f  “common-sense” application o f  the law  (that abnormal behavior should be 
treated) is directly counter to  the reforms that have been applied to mental health statutes 
specifically to protect the rights o f  the mentally ill.
The foregoing results point in  the direction o f judges who have not received the 
educational preparation that would be consistent vdth an adequate foundation for making 
involuntary commitment decisions. Even so, o f  the 71 deans who responded to the 
question, ""Do you  believe that involuntary cotnmitment decisions should continue to be 
made by judges?, ” 70 (64%) answered yes. There was only one dissenting vote (1%).
A look at the training judges receive in mental health law  and abnormal 
psychology becomes well-targeted when considering the consequences o f  the decisions 
they make regarding the lives o f  mentally ill individuals. As part o f  her work in the field 
o f  mental health, the author has witnessed some disturbing incidents involving the 
involuntary commitment process.
In  one instance, she visited with an attorney who had been assigned to  represent an 
indigent patient facing commitment, and who had requested a jury  trial, instead o f  the 
customary hearing— a right which is stipulated by mental health law. This particular 
attorney was covering commitment cases for one particular county while the attorney 
who normally represented indigent clients was on vacation. During the course o f  a 
conversation with the author she said, “I ’ve never even read the mental health law. I’m 
ju st covering for the attorney who’s on vacation. I don’t  know what to do for a  person 
wanting a jury trial.” Further, this particular attorney did not even know where to  find a
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copy of the law. The author faxed her a copy, for which she was very grateful. 
Nevertheless, such a lack o f knowledge (and or unwillingness to search it out) speaks 
directly to what may be considered a lack of judicial concern for those individuals facing 
the potential loss of their freedom as well as possibly forced treatment—medicinally or 
otherwise.
On another occasion, the author came in contact with a doctor (who regularly 
petitioned judges to involuntarily commit his patients) who made the comment while 
referring to a patient, “He’s EOD’d (Emergency Order of Detention). We can do 
anything we want to him.”
And in one especially disturbing case, a compliant, non-violent, mentally ill, elderly 
woman was taken away in shackles to a state hospital. As she cried, “What did I do?” 
bystanders asked if the police officers could transport her without shackles. Following 
their understanding of the law, the officers said, “We have to [keep her in shackles].
She’s a mental patient.” Such instances, albeit anecdotal, call into question whether the 
rights of the mentally ill are being protected, and whether judges could be better prepared 
to insure the same. Only further research can shed light on how pervasive the problem 
may be, or whether certain instances represent the insensitivity of only a few.
Several weaknesses impact the generalizability o f this study. First, a 59% response 
rate is lower than one would prefer in a survey study. Second, some of the deans 
surveyed failed to answer certain questions, lowering the response rate for those 
particular items. Lastly, instructors may emphasize mental health law and or abnormal 
psychology issues in their courses without the deans of academic affairs being totally 
aware o f this contingency. Nevertheless, if, as this study suggests, judges are not
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adequately prepared educationally to recognize mental illness and apply the statutory 
laws mandated for involuntary commitment, certain recommendations emerge. 
Recommendations for Training
Any recommendations that present as a function of the foregoing research must be 
balanced against the practical and economic realities attendant to training and practice.
As such, one must consider several key issues. First, how many lawyers and judges 
actually practice mental health law in the United States? Second, how economically 
feasible is it to train all future attorneys in abnormal psychology and mental health law, 
when the bulk of them will likely not practice that subspecialty? And third, are there 
ways to offer the appropriate training in abnormal psychology and mental health law to 
only those lawyers and judges who will actually participate in civil commitment (or other 
applicable) hearings. Given these caveats, the following recommendations are set forth.
First, law schools could offer specific training (possibly in the form of a seminar open 
to students of the law school as well as outside individuals) on an annual or biannual 
basis for lawyers or judges who plan on, or who have accepted assignments to practice 
mental health law. This training would include the mental health law of the state in which 
the law school resides. Such training could include a didactic component that clearly 
spells out the established criteria for the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill. A 
clear understanding of the legal criteria that a mentally ill person must meet prior to civil 
commitment would be a major part of this training. At a minimum, what constitutes the 
criteria for dangerousness to self or others, and what constitutes the criteria for being 
unable to take care of one’s basic needs as a function of their mental illness should 
receive close attention.
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A second area of training that could be offered has to do with the recognition of the 
signs and symptoms of mental illness. While such training could have potential value to 
all future attorneys and judges, education in this area could be offered on a seminar basis 
similar to or included with that described for mental health law. Training in this area 
could be both didactic and practical. Indeed, law students and practicing attorneys could 
benefit greatly from the experience of interacting with the mentally ill, especially in a 
civil commitment capacity. This type of training could include a minimum of 1 multi- 
component seminar in abnormal psychology that would cover the basic manifestations of 
severe mental illness, the types of treatment available for those illnesses, and how the 
legal criteria for commitment coincide with the same. That seminar could offer basic 
training for future and current judges and attorneys in the use of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-IV)—a complete 
compendium of mental disorders, their signs and symptoms, course and prevalence. 
Disorders often attendant to civil commitment, such as schizophrenia, personality 
disorders, and mood disorders should be highlighted.
Limited (1-3 day) practicum experiences could follow, giving future attorneys and 
judges the opportunity to work with mentally ill clients, and participate in involuntary 
commitment hearings. Training in this area would offer future attorneys and judges a 
valuable foundation in mental illness that could be applied to many facets of law and 
interactions with clients. Further, exposure to the literature on the issues surrounding the 
training, expertise and practice o f a variety of mental health professionals, and exposure 
to practicing mental health professionals would offer future judges a basic foundation of 
information with regard to how to effectively work with mental health professionals in
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the critical area of civil commitment. Perhaps state and/or national organizations (such as 
the American Bar Association, American Association of Law Schools, and the American 
Psychological Association) could collaborate on programs or comprehensive seminars 
that would benefit the constituents of both the legal and psychological organizations.
Given what we know about therapeutic jurisprudence and its effects on treatment 
outcome, it is recommended that law schools offer training in this area. Again, such 
training could be offered as a single seminar, or as part o f a larger training effort. 
Therapeutic jurisprudence has the potential to change the manner in which clients and 
their mental illness will be approached in that therapeutic jurisprudence proposes that 
clients be given the opportunity to participate in their hearings, be treated with dignity 
and respect, and receive judicial mandates in an environment o f trust. Indeed, as noted 
earlier, when clients perceive the process of an involuntary commitment hearing as fair, 
they are more likely to benefit from treatment, whether or not they agree with the 
outcome of the civil commitment hearing. Training of attorneys in this area would be 
highly beneficial, and could be applicable to many other areas o f legal practice.
Adversarial representation is something about which law students learn as they study 
how to defend clients. Indeed an adversarial process is the foundation upon which our 
judicial system is based. That same adversarial representation should be taught to 
attorneys who represent mentally ill clients in their involuntary commitment hearings. To 
do any less is to somehow relegate the mentally ill to a position subordinate to those 
accused of crimes. To receive no training in adversarial representation for mentally ill 
clients would seem to make a tacit statement that mentally ill clients as well as their 
rights and freedom are not important enough to warrant such representation. Once again.
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a component addressing adversarial representation could be included in a broad training 
seminar.
Lastly, the decision-making process attendant to the involuntary commitment process 
should be explored with future and current attorneys and judges who work with or have 
plans to work with the mentally ill. A critical evaluation of how we perceive the mentally 
ill and their need for treatment is a crucial component of understanding the mentally ill 
and appropriately applying laws that govern their freedom and imposed treatment. A 
decision-making process that is congruent with the laws that govern civil commitment 
should be taught so that a parens patriae or common sense approach is not arbitrarily used 
by default.
Truly, treatment of the mentally ill has dramatically improved since the days of 
spinning cages, and the chaining of people to beds stained with excrement. Statutory 
mandates now offer legal protection to those found to be mentally unsound. No longer 
can individuals be civilly committed without the due process afforded by law.
Empirically validated treatments now exist for the treatment of many mental disorders. 
Even so, many of our mentally ill may not meet the criteria by which that treatment 
comes to be mandated. Indeed, the weighty decision to take away an individual’s 
freedom as a function of their mental illness, and possibly force treatment for the same, 
dictates that we must be sure that we are abiding by the laws that have been designed to 
protect the rights of those who are victims of mental illnesses.
While many professionals may be involved in the process o f civilly committing a 
mentally ill individual, mental health judges and defending attorneys are tasked with 
carrying out the judicial end of that process—that is insuring that the laws are followed.
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Indeed, such was the point of years of reforms that demanded that the law intercede in 
such a sensitive matter. Judges in particular have the responsibility to insure that mentally 
ill persons brought before the court are given due process. They have the duty to insure 
that the rights o f the mentally ill are protected insofar as involuntary commitment and 
treatment are concerned.
This study, however, suggests that those tasked with judicial oversight in this area, 
may not have the training or education necessary for the reasonable application of 
psychological knowledge and mental health law in hearings designed to determine who 
meets the strict criteria for involuntary commitment and forced treatment. Training in 
those crucial areas could mediate this problem. By requiring fundamental training (via 
seminars or workshops) in mental health law and abnormal psychology for those who 
will practice or currently practice mental health law, law schools (possibly in concert 
with legal and psychological associations) will be in a better position to insure that future 
judges and attorneys are adequately prepared to recognize mental illness and 
appropriately determine whether those so afflicted meet the statutory requirements that 
could result in civil commitment and forced treatment. Further, by providing such 
training for attorneys and judges currently practicing mental health law, they would be 
offering a valuable community service and contributing to the protection of the rights of 
individuals who clearly need such protection.
Areas for Future Research
As with most research, this study answered several questions. It also raised many 
other questions appropriate for continued investigation in the area of judicial training.
The following questions could be well-targeted as the areas of training in mental health
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law and abnormal psychology are researched. Just how many attorneys and judges 
currently practice mental health law in the United States. What are the various capacities 
in which mental health law is practiced (i.e. involuntary commitment hearings, 
competency hearings, etc.)? What does the legal profession’s ethical code say about 
practicing any subset of law without specific training in that area? What is the general 
scope of licensure with regard to practicing law and demonstrating competence in any 
subspecialty? What do the syllabi of law school courses reveal in the way of topics 
applicable to abnormal psychology and mental health law?
Is mental health law covered on the bar exam? Does the American Bar Association 
currently offer any continuing education with respect to subjects relevant to mental health 
law? Do American Bar Association and American Association of Law Schools accredited 
schools require any prerequisite undergraduate work in abnormal psychology? What do 
mental health professionals, mental health consumers, the general public, and practicing 
attorneys and judges have to say about the potential need for training in abnormal 
psychology and mental health law for attorneys and judges practicing mental health law? 
The answers to these and other relevant questions have the potential to further refine and 
improve upon the reforms that have so dramatically improved how we treat the mentally 
ill in the United States.
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The University of Oklahoma
DEPARTMENT O F  EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
October 1,2000
Dear Dean of Academic Affairs,
My colleagues and I are conducting a study about the training provided at American Bar Association (ABA) 
and American Association of Law Schools (AALS) accredited training programs with regard to mental 
health law and abnormal psychology. Specifically, we are interested in the types and amoimt of training 
students receive in these two areas.
Your name was selected from a list of APA and AALS accredited law schools, as we are attempting to 
contact the Deatis of Academic Affairs of all accredited law schools. We would appreciate it if you would 
take only a few minutes of your time to participate in our short research project The survey should take no 
longer than 10 minutes to complete. A stamped and return-addressed envelope has been provided for you to 
return you answers to us.
We hope that the results of this investigation will provide information to assist us in understanding the 
training future attorneys and judges may receive in the areas of mental health law and abnormal psychology. 
As with any research, your participation is voluntary, and yoim responses will be kept confidential. Please do 
not put your name on the questionnaire. At no time will your answers appear with your name, or the name of 
your institution. Indeed, your responses will be totally anonymous. No direct risks or benefits are associated 
with participation in this research.
Thank you for taking the time to assist us with our research. If you have any questions about this research, or 
would like a copy of the results, please contact Gail Poyner at (405) 391-4062 or at imovnerûokcitwtds.net. 
This research study has been approved by the Institutional Review Board in the Office of Research and 
Administration at the University of Oklahoma. Should you have any questions about your rights as a 
research participant, you may call the Office o f Research Administration at (405) 325-4757.
The information you provide us will contribute to a better understanding of an important interface between 
attorneys and judges and the topic of mental illness and mental health law. We recognize that the demands 
on your time are many, and therefore your participation is greatly appreciated.
Respectfully,
Gail Poyner, wTEd. Dr. Terry Pace
Principal Investigator Co-Investigator/Advisor/Associate Professor
Doctoral Student, University of Oklahoma University of Oklahoma
820 v an  Vlael Oval, Room 321. Norman, Oklahoma 73019-2041 PHONE; (405) 325-5974 FAX: (405) 325-8555
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Accredited Law Schools 
Training in Mental Health Law and Abnormal Psychology
Purl I: Tu be cuiupleted by the Secretary to the Dean u f  Acuileittic Affairs 
Part I: Ipstiturion/Program Information
1. My institution IS G Public □ Private
2. The graduate degree my program offers is GJ.D. □ Other.
(Please Specify)
3. Approximately how many faculty members does your proeram  (law school) employ? 
Full-time faculty ___________  Part-time or adjunct faculty _________
Approximately how many students are enrolled in your institution (not just in your program)?
□ Under 5,000
□ 5,000 to 9,999 0 45,000 to 49,999
□ 10,000 to 14,999 □ 50,000 to 54,999
Û 15,000 to 19,999 □ 55,000 to 59,999
□ 20,000 to 24,999 □ 60,000 to 64,999
□ 25,000 to 29,999 0 65,000 to 69,999
□ 30,000 to 34,999 □ 70,000 to 74,999
0 35,000 to 39,999 0 75,000 to 79,999
□ 40,000 to 44,999 □ 80,000 or more
5. Approximately how many students are enrolled in your accredited law proeraml
6. Does your program provide coursework, seminars, clinical practica or any training related to mental
health law  ? 0  Yes ONo
If yes, coursework in mental health law is; □ Required □ Elective # o f  credit hours______
If yes, seminars, practica, or workshops in mental health law  are: D Required 0  Elective # o f  credit 
hours_______
7. Does your program provide coursework, seminars, clinical practica or any training related to abnormal
psvcholosvl □ Yes □ No
If yes, coursework in abnormal psvcholoev is: □ Required □ Elective #  o f  credit hours______
If yes, seminars, practica, or workshops in abnormal psvcholoev are: □ Required 0  Elective f# of 
credit hours_______
8. Please list any courses you offer in mental health law  and/or abnormal osvcholo^v
Please give the  fo llow ins pase to the Dean o f  Academic A ffa irs for completion. Tltatik You!
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Part H: Training Information
1. Please rank from I-Sthetrainingemphasisyour program places on the following types of law:
( 1 = most emphasis; 8 = least emphasis)
Civil   Tax . ______
Criminal   Trial ______
Business   Mental Health ______
Corporate __ Other (please s p e c i f y ) ______________________________________________
2. Please indicate the importance you place on training in mental health law:
1__________ 2_______  3 4__________5
extremely quite somewhat somewhat quite extremely
unimportant unimportant unmqxMtant important importam important
3. Please indicate the importance you place on training in abnormal osvcholoçnr.
1________ 2 3 4  5_____ 6
extremely quite somewhat somewhat quite extremely
unimportant unimportant unimportant important important important
4. Please check any specifics that are covered in your instruction of mental health law:
0  The mental health law ofthe state in which you reside
0  General overview of mental health law
0  Dangerousness to self
□ Dangerousness to others
□ Inability to care for basic needs due to  a mental illness
0  Emergency Detention
G Involuntary Commitment
G Adversarial representation of mentally ill client facing involumary commitment
0  Court commitment paperwork
□ Decirion-maldng process for court commitment
□ Least restrictive treatment
□ Rights ofthe mentally ill
□ Parens Patriae approach to civil commitment
0  Other (please specify)___________________________________
5. Please check any specifics that are covered in your instruction of abnormal psvcholoev:
0 Diagnostic and Statisrical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (DSM-IV)
G Mental Retardation/Developmental Disorders 0 Dissociative Disorders
□ Cognitive Disorders—delirium, dementia, amnestic, etc. □ Eating Disorders
0 Mental Disorders due to medical conditions 0 Anxiety Disorders
□ Substance-related disorders □ Factitious Disorders
□ Schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders □ Adjustment Disorders
c Mood Disorders □ Psychopharmacology
Q Somatoform Disorders □ Assessmem Methods
□ Impulse-Control Disorders 0 Sleep Disorders
0 Personality Disorders 0 Treatment Modalities
□ Sexual/Gender Identity Disorders
6. Do you believe that involuntary commitment decisions should continue to be made by judges? 
□ Yes □ No If No, by whom should these decisions be made?_______________________
7. Do you have any comments about the training o f attorneys in the areas of mental health law and/or 
abnormal t}svcholo2 vl □ No □ Yes (Please write any comments on the reverse side of this page.)
Thank you very nmcli fo r  your participatioiL Please return litis survey in the SASH pruvideiL For resulls 
please contact Gail Poyner at 14211 S.E. 44^ Sl . Choctaw. OK 73020 405-3914062 gpoyiierfaokcity.tils.ner
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October 30, 2000
Dear Dean o f  Academic Affairs,
A few weeks ago I mailed you the enclosed survey, which is 
part o f  a research study being conducted at all ABA and AALS 
accredited law schools. If  you have already returned the survey, 
please accept my thanks for your participation. There is no need 
to fill out a  second response.
If  you have not returned the survey you received in September, I 
hope will take just a few minutes to complete the enclosed one. 
Your input is greatly needed to gain a true picture o f the 
research being conducted.
Thank you again for your participation. It is very much 
appreciated.
Respectfully,
Gail A. Poyner 
Doctoral Student
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INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPUCATTON 
FOR APPROVAL OF THE USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED ON THE 
NORMAN CAMPUS AND/OR BY UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA FACULTY, STAFF OR STUDENTS
Your application for approval of the  u se  of human subjects should consist of eleven (11) copies* of three parts;
PART I - A COMPLETED APPUCATION FORM 
PART II - A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR RESEARCH STUDY
PART III .  SUBJECTS INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPATION IN YOUR STUDY
You should attach supplementary information pertinent to  this study that will help the  board members in their 
review of your application, i.e., questionnaires, te s t instruments, letters of approval from cooperating institutions 
or/and organizations. Failure to submit these items will only delay your review.
Applications are due not later than the 1 s t dav of the month in which vou wish the proposed project reviewed
Please return completed proposals to: U.S. Mail:
Office of Research Administration 
Campus Mail; 1000 Asp Avenue, Room 314
Office of Research Administration Norman, Oklahoma 73019-0430
Buchanan Hall, Room 314
Please call the ORA at 325-4757 and ask for the IRB if you have any questions. P lease type your responses.




Campus Phone No. 325-2914________________________ E-mail Address  QPOvner@okcitv.tds.net
If you are  a  student, provide the following information;
Daytime Phone No. 405-391-4062
Mailing A ddress_ 14211 S.E. 44*' Choctaw, OK 73020
Faculty S p o n s o r  Dr. T ony  Pace
Department Educational Psvcholoov Sponsor's Phone No.. 325-2914
Co-Principal lnvestigator(s) (Please include name, department, and cam pus phone number) 
None
Co-Principal lnvestigator(s)
Faculty Sponsor (if student research project)
1 - hUpVAe«a»fch.ou.edu/Fomt«/WBFomi2000.doc
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. . , _____   jww. uao ui iiuinan suDjecis would b e  considered exempt from review o r qualifies for
exped ited  review a s  defined in S ections 4  an d  12 of th e  University of Oklahom a N orm an C am p u s Policy 
an d  P ro c ed u res  for th e  Protection of H um an S ub jec ts  in R e sea rch  Acdvrties, you m ay  subm it two (2) 
co p ie s  o f th is application for initial review. If full Board review is required, you will b e  required to  subm it 
n ine  (9) additional copies.
2 . P ro jec t Title: An Exploration of Am erican B ar A ssociation and  Am erican Association o f Law Schools 
A ccredited  Training P rogram s in th e  A reas of M ental H ealth Law an d  Abnormal Psvcholoov
3. P ro jec t T im e Period: From October, 20000  to  J u n e  2001
4 . P rev io u s Institutional Review Board-N orm an C am pus Approval fo r this project?
Y e s   No X
If y es , p le a se  g ive d a te  of the  action
5. A re you  requesting  funding support for th is  project?
Y e s   N o . X
If y es , p le a se  give spo n so r's  nam e
6. D escription of H um an Subjects:
A ge R a n g e  25-90_________________________ G en d er (p lease  ch e ck  one): M ales:____ F em ales;
Both X
N um ber of S u b jec ts  181
S pecia l Qualifications 
D e a n s  of A cadem ic Affairs a t  all U .S . accred ited  law  schoo ls
S o u rc e  o f  S u b jec ts  an d  Selection Criteria
A m erican  B ar A ssodation  an d  Am erican A ssociation o f Law S chools
P le a s e  c h e c k  a n y  protected groups included in this study.
 P re g n a n t W om en ___ F e tu se s   Children
 M entally D isabled ___ Elderly
 M entally R eta rded _______________ ___ P risoners
2 - Mlp'yfreMarcti.ou.edu/FanTB/UWFonii2000.doc
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Institutional Review Board Application
P art I : Application Form
1. Principal Investigator:
Gail A. Poyner, M.EcL 
Department of Educational Psychology 
Room 321,820 Van Vleet Oval 
University o f Oklahoma 
Norman, OK 73019-2041




An Exploration ofAmerican Bar Association and American Association ofLaw Schools 
Accredited Training Programs in the Areas o f Mental Health Law and Abnormal Psychology
3. Project Time Period:
Academic year 2000-2001. Mailing of research packets to potential participants is scheduled for 
the first week of October, 2000. Reminder letters and a second packet, if  needed, may take place 
following the initial mail-out
4. Previous ERB-Norman Campus Approval:
Yes
5. Are you requesting funding for this project?
No
6. Description of human subjects:
Participants will be Deans o f Academic Affairs of all American Bar Association and American 
Association o f Law Schools Accredited Training Programs. Approximately 200 Deans of 
Academic Affairs will receive research materials by mail for their voluntary completion A 
minimum o f 100 participants is desired.
7. Source o f subjects and selection criteria:
All Deans o f Academic Affairs of accredited law schools will be mailed research packets. A 
mailing list will be obtained from the American Bar Association and the American Association 
for Law Schools. Other than identification as a Dean o f Academic Affairs of an accredited law 
school, no selection criteria will be in force.
1 0 0
P art H: Description of the Study
A. Purpose/Objectives;
There is currently very little research available that examines the training attorneys and judges 
receive in the areas o f mental health law and abnormal psychology. Knowledge of these areas is 
crucial to their role in the emergency detention and involuntary commitment of mental health 
patients. The purpose o f the present study is to survey the Deans of Academic Affairs o f all 
accredited law schools in the United States to determine what percentage o f  training programs 
require instruction in mental health law; to determine what percentage o f accredited training 
programs reqtrire training in abnormal psychology; to determine how much training is required 
of future attorneys and judges; to determine what methods are used to train attorneys and judges 
in recognizing mental illness; to determine what elective coursework is available in the areas of 
mental health law and/or abnormal psychology, and to determine if any recommendations 
emerge for strengthening attomey/judge preparation in the area o f mental health law and 
abnormal psychology.
B. Research Protocol:
The attached materials will be mailed to all Deans o f Academic Affairs o f all accredited law 
schools in the United States. A complete list o f accredited law schools will be obtained from the 
American Bar Association and the American Association o f Law Schools. The survey questions 
are designed to be answered easily, and will take approximately 10 minutes or less to answer. 
Stamped, addressed return envelopes will be provided in the research packets, as will a cover 
letter introducing the study. An enticement (attached) will be included for the secretaries to the 
Deans, as they will be asked to complete the demographic portion of the study, and then forward 
the second half o f  the instrument to the Deans. A follow up mailing may take place after the 
initial mailout
C. Confidentiality:
Participants will be instructed to not put their names on any o f the research instruments, and will 
be assured o f the confidentiality of their responses. In no place will the respondents’ names 
appear with their responses, nor will there be any attempt to track responses by name or 
institution.
D. Subject Benefit/Risk:
No direct benefits to participants are provided as part of this research. Participants will be made 
aware of all human subjects rights, including the voluntary nature of participation. There is no 
deception in any o f the research procedures. No direct r is ^  have been identified for potential 
respondents.
1 0 1
The University of Oklahoma
O F FIC E  O F  R ESEA R CH  ADMINISTRATION
September 12,2000
Ms. Gail A. Poyner 
14211 SE 44th 
Choctaw OK 73020
Dear Ms. Poyner;
Your research application, "An Exploration of American Bar Association and American 
Association of Law Schools Accredited Training Programs in the Areas of Mental Health Law 
and Abnormal Psychology," has been reviewed according to the policies of the Institutional 
Review Board chaired by Dr. E. Laurette Taylor and found to be exempt from the requirements 
for full board review. Your project is approved under the regulations of the University of 
Oklahoma - Norman Campus Policies and Procedures for the Protection o f Human Subjects in 
Research Activities.
Should you wish to deviate from the described protocol, you must notify me and obtain prior 
approval from the Board for the changes. If the research is to extend beyond 12 months, you 
must contact this offrce, in writing, noting any changes or revisions in the protocol and/or 
informed consent form, and request an extension of this ruling.
If you have any questions, please contact me.
Sincerely yours,





cc: Dr. E. Laurette Taylor, Chair, Institutional Review Board
Dr. Terry Pace, Educational Psychology
1 0 2
Student: Gail Poyner
Prospectus Title: A n  E xplora tion  o f  A m erican B ar A ssociation a n d  A m erican  
A ssocia tion  o fL a w  Schools A ccred ited  Training Program s in  the A rea s o f  M ental 
H ealth Law  a n d  A bnorm al P sychology  
Department: Educational Psychology 
Program: Counseling Psychology









Doctoral Student/University of Oklahoma
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Objectives
The objectives of the proposed study are to examine the standard training practices of 
American Bar Association (ABA) and American Association of Law Schools (AALS) accredited 
training programs with regard to mental health law and abnormal psychology. The questions this 
study will seek to answer are: I) What percentage of ABA/AALS accredited training programs 
require training in mental health law? 2) What percentage of ABA/AALS accredited training 
programs require training in abnormal psychology? 3) How much training is required of future 
attorneys in the areas of mental health law and abnormal psychology? 4) What methods are used 
to train attorneys in recognizing mental illness? 5) What elective coursework is available in the 
areas of mental health law and/or abnormal psychology? 6) What recommendations emerge for 
strengthening attomey/judge preparation in the area of mental health law and abnormal 
psychology?
B. Background
Historically, mentally impaired individuals have been subject to inhumane legal and 
“■therapeutic” practices. In the 1400’s, one could be indefinitely committed to a mental institution 
with no legal or procedural safeguards. Hilgard (1987) offers a concise look at an era whose 
appalling treatment of those thought to be mentally ill reminds us of how far we’ve come. From 
1402 imtil 1930, the Bethlehem Royal Hospital in England was the standard of 
institutionalization, with similar conditions existing throughout most of Europe. Bedlam
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The prison-like atmosphere of the asylums was notably absent from Tuke’s retreat, as were the 
standard medical treatments of purging and bloodletting. The retreat represented an incredible 
improvement over former conditions.
According to Hilgard (1987), the movement soon spread to the United States and was 
advanced, in part, by Eli Todd who was a practicing physician and who addressed the 
Cotmecticut Medical Society about the work of Pinel. In 1824, the Hartford Retreat was 
established, with Eli Todd as its medical director. Based on his example, several states soon 
followed suit and founded publicly supported hospitals for the mentally infirm. Unfortunately, 
though, many o f those were only marginally better than the asylums that had preceded them and 
many ofthe mentally ill continued to be housed in jails or other facilities for the needy. It was 
Dorothea Dix, a Sunday School teacher in Boston, who took notice of the poor treatment of 
mentally ill patients who were routinely housed with criminals. Over a 40-year period, she 
succeeded in improving the facilities in several states, building or renovating 30 other state 
institutions, and influencing the same progress in Europe and Japan.
Each of these reforms, writes Hilgard (1987), contributed to asylums becoming hospitals 
whose patients had the opportunity to recover and regain their freedom. Many of the patients 
remained ill but, due to the reforms, they were no longer forced to reside with criminals. And 
even though the mentally ill continued to be regularly restrained, and no medical modalities 
existed to treat them, the early 19'** century saw the beginnings of humane conditions for some of 
its neediest individuals. But even with improved living conditions, actual treatment was 
relatively nonexistent at the time. It was Johann Reil, a German physician, who in 1803 first 
introduced the notion that mental illness was a psychological phenomenon and should be treated 
with psychological methods. He advocated that the term “hospital for psychotherapy,” replace
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“lunatic asylum” when referring to those places designated to treat the mentally ill. He promoted 
a hospital where the incurable would be made comfortable, be given things to occupy their time, 
and the treatable to receive therapy with the hope o f curing their mental illness.
Hilgard (1987), cites others as having early, yet profound effects on the coiuse of 
reforming the process whereby the mentally ill received help for their various afflictions. 
Charcot, Janet, and Freud, among others, further advanced psychotherapy as a treatment for 
mental illness, which clearly offered vast improvements on earlier methods. Another influential 
person was Clifford Beers, who was himself a former mentally ill patient, and who, in 1908, 
wrote The M ind That Fovnd Itself. The “Mental Hygiene Movement” was initiated as a result of 
Beers’ personal and forthcoming book. This movement focused on the problems of the mentally 
ill, as well as increased the awareness of those inclined to acknowledge a heretofore relatively 
ignored and disenfianchised population. Indeed, the process of reformation had begun, and the 
early 19*** century represented a significant improvement, as compared to its 18* century 
predecessor, with regard to how the mentally ill were viewed, housed, and treated. Conditions 
remained far from ideal, but were in stark contrast to earlier times. But however improved 
conditions were, the fact remained that coerced entrance into the world of institutionalization 
was relatively imcomplicated, and could still be accomplished against one’s will, and without 
legal, medical, or procedural safeguards.
With the development o f state and public hospitals, wherein the mentally impaired could 
receive help for their problems, concomitant attention was given to the process of civilly 
committing one to such treatment Prior to the mid 19* century, family members, police, 
physicians or others could easily commit the mentally infirm to involuntary treatment solely on 
the basis that the person was “in need of treatment” It was generally assumed that family
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members, and others, were acting in the patient’s best interests and so little judicial involvement 
was deemed necessary. However, when state facilities began to proliferate, it became necessary 
to look at some controls for the process o f civil commitment, and so the much needed, albeit 
immature, process o f legislative purview was initiated. It now became more difficult for others to 
civilly commit the heretofore-disenfianchised “limatics” and “insane,” as the mentally ill now 
had the beginnings o f a legal voice. No longer could greedy relatives collude with physicians to 
institutionalize their wealthy, but disparaged, family members (as was often purported to be the 
case), nor could troublesome family members be civilly committed without a modicum of due 
process (Appelbaum 1994).
Much like Clifford Beers, another former patient, Mrs. E.P.W. Packard, sought change 
with regard to the involuntary commitment ofthe mentally ill. She advocated for jury trials for 
those faced with civil commitment, so that the rationale for such action could be formally 
adjudicated. The work o f  Mrs. Packard, combined with that of others, had the effect of requiring 
hearings for the mentally ill—including those at private hospitals. It also impacted the medical 
aspect o f commitment by requiring physicians to actually examine potential candidates prior to 
proceedings for commitment, as well as sign an affidavit that noted that the physician did not 
stand to gain financially from such an action (Appelbaum 1994; Szasz 1963).
The public attention afforded the process of involimtarily detaining patients waxed and 
waned according to the political emphasis of the times. When those advocating rapid 
hospitalization brought their message to the fore, the push for judicial reform and addition of 
stringent controls was reduced. However, when a more civil libertarian approach was promoted, 
protective, legal statutes took the spotlight, and the push for change intensified Indeed, the first 
half of the twentieth century saw an abundance of the former, as more and more concern was
107
Prospectus/Gail Poyner 6
expressed over patients having to endure legal hearings more reminiscent o f criminal 
proceedings than expeditious treatment for the mentally ill. Social activists proposed that the 
power of civil commitment be transferred away fiom the court and into the domain o f  medicine. 
Using a medico-legal model, one or two physicians would assume the authority to make such 
decisions, with a patient having an after-the-fact hearing only if he/she so desired. Some states 
adopted such statutes. Others elected to continue with mandatoiy judicial hearings, but left an as 
yet unmentioned, although significant, problem in the hands of judges. The problem, that o f the 
judge deciding whether or not to inform civil commitment candidates about their hearings, was 
ever salient, and became the crux o f fiiture judicial decisions with regard to involuntary 
commitment (Appelbaum 1994).
The legislative reform o f involimtaty commitment laws has been, like most legal major 
decisions, more a process than an event Various tenets have influenced that process and have 
been reflected through the years in numerous decisions made on state and Supreme Court levels. 
Applebaum (1997), in one of his many looks at the laws and process o f  civil commitment sums 
up the reforms made from 1964-1979:
These forces, taken as a whole, culminated in a radical transformation o f the law of civil 
commitment that essentially altered the status quo in every state in the nation over the course o f  
15 years. Use o f involuntaiy commitment was limited to persons who were likely to be 
dangerous to themselves or others, the latter category including those so impaired as to be unable 
to meet their basic needs. The law allowing hospitalization of persons solely because they were 
“in need o f treatment”—the historic standard of commitment in this country—was abandoned. In 
addition, a set of procedural rights was imported from the criminal law, including rights to a 
hearing, notice, representation by an attorney, to testify on ones’ own behalf, to call and cross- 
examine witnesses, and to exclude evidence that chd not meet the ordinary standards o f  
admissibility. Although states varied in the details o f their statutes, the basic thrust o f the reforms 
was similar in every state.
Reactions to the dramatic changes in the rights afforded to those presumed mentally ill 
were varied. Embraced by some, and eschewed by others, subsequent civil commitment law has
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been examined, reexamined, commented on, challenged, and explored at length in the literature. 
Indeed, the topic of civil commitment can elicit some very strident opinions from those familiar 
with the process of treating and protecting the rights of the mentally ill.
The process of formulating laws to protect the rights of the mentally ill has not 
been without debate. Disparate views have marked the judicial/mental health landscape, and 
have been alternately responsible for bringing discrete agendas to the fore and influencing the 
direction of the legislation at the time. The strata of opinion with regard to the rights of those 
who may be in need o f mental health treatment is much more complex than the dichotomous 
presentation o f civil libertarians vs. those who advocate for more protective positions o f the 
right, or need, to treat those so afflicted. It is doubtful that anyone familiar with the tenets of the 
individual arguments would consider them totally and mutually exclusive. And yet two basic 
positions have emerged with regard to the rights afforded those who suffer from mental 
impairment For the purposes of this proposal, those positions have been titled Civil Libertarians, 
those advocating against what they consider legally sanctioned coercion, and “Dying With 
Rights On,” a term made popular by a Wisconsin psychiatrist by the name of Darryl Treffert an 
early critic of civil commitment law reform (Appelbaum, 1994).
States have long struggled to find a balance between protecting the civil liberties of their 
mentally ill, while ensuring that opportunities for treatment (however mandated) are extended to 
those in need of such services. Aviram & Weyer (1996) offered a succinct conceptualization of 
the debate in the opening of their paper Changing Trends in Mental Health Legislation: Anatomy 
o f Reforming a Civil commitment Law. They wrote: “During the past twenty-five years, U.S. 
public policy involving civil commitment o f persons with mental illness swung like a pendulum 
between two opposing poles: the medical-psychiatric and the legal models. The former
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emphasizes medical considerations o f a person’s need for treatment and allows easier 
commitment to psychiatric institutions; the latter focuses on legal procedural safeguards and 
protection of civil liberties during commitment proceedings and makes commitment more 
restrictive.” Aviram & Weyer (1996) highlight the evolving and often alternating trends of civil 
libertarian approaches and social service orientations in their paper, and note that the special 
interests o f the parties shaping mental health legislation are often outside the mental health 
system.
Because this proposed study will originate from the state o f Oklahoma, a look at the 
state’s mental health laws is included. The Department o f Mental Health and Substance Abuse 
Services publishes and disseminates the Emergency Detention Manual & Guidelines for the state 
of Oklahoma (DMHSAS, 1997). The introduction o f the manual sums up the purpose and intent 
of Oklahoma’s mental health law as it applies to emergency detention.
The purpose of the Oklahoma Mental Health Law is to provide for the humane care and 
treatment of persons who are mentally ill or who require treatment for drug and alcohol abuse. 
All such residents of this state are entitled to medical care and treatment in accordance with the 
highest standards accepted in medical practice.
There are circumstances which justify the taking of an individual into protective custody 
for the purposes o f initiating emergency detention proceedings. The emergency detention 
proceedings should be iititiated only when there are no other acceptable alternatives for 
individuals who appear to be in need of treatment for mental illness or substance abuse. The 
emergency detention process is designed to ensure an individual receives appropriate treatment 
in addition to protecting the individual or other persons from dangers resulting from the mental 
illness or substance abuse.
Protective custody and emergency detention are utilized as temporary measures for the 
speedy processing of emergency situations with the objective of suppressing and preventing 
conduct which is likely to create a clear and present danger to the individual or other persons. 
Emergency detention must not be ittilized merely as a  convenience to the parties involved in a 
particular situation. Under the police powers of the state, the right to initiate an emergency 
detention has been upheld by the courts. However, protective custody, emergency detention, and 
involuntary commitments deprive individuals o f their liberty and should not be taken lightly. 
Therefore, constitutional due process is afforded to individuals subject to the emergency 
detention process. The due process includes, but is not limited to, the right to notice, the right to
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counsel, the right to jury trial, the right to be present in the hearing, the right to present and cross- 
examine witnesses, and the right to challenge detention through a habeas corpus action.
It is the responsibility of law enforcement, the judicial system (judges, prosecutors, and 
defense attorneys), and mental health professionals to ensure that individuals falling within the 
jurisdiction of the Oklahoma mental health laws are afforded their constitutional and statutory 
rights.
As with most legal documents, the laws that govern the judicial process afforded to those 
who face involuntary detention are copious and extensively worded. Nevertheless, the basics of 
Oklahoma’s most salient emergency detention laws, and the associated rights of those facing 
them, can be briefly summarized by the following:
1. A person placed in protective custody must be examined by a licensed mental health 
professional within 12 hours of being taken into custody to determine if emergency 
detention is warranted,
2. If emergency detention is warranted, the licensed mental health professional shall 
prepare a statement describing the findings of the examination and stating the basis 
for the determination. The statement will be in the form provided by the Department 
of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services.
3. The licensed mental health professional shall provide for a full examination and 
evaluation o f the person by two licensed mental health professionals.
4. A person may be detained in emergency detention more than 72 hours only if  the 
facility is presented with a copy o f an order of the district court authorizing further 
detention.
5. If a copy of an order for further detention is not delivered to the facility by the end of 
the period of emergency detention, the person requiring treatment shall be discharged 
unless said person has applied for voluntary treatment
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6. The person alleged to be mentally ill has the following rights: right to notice, right to 
counsel, right to a hearing, r i ^ t  to a jury trial if  requested, right to be present at the 
hearing or trial and the right to present and to cross-examine witnesses.
7. The attorney appointed by the court for persons who have no counsel shall meet and 
consult with person within one day of the notification of the appointment and shall 
present to the person their rights as stated by the Oklahoma and United States 
constitutions.
8. If the person is found at the hearing to be mentally ill and requiring treatment, the 
court will take evidence and make findings of fact concerning the person’s 
competency to consent or to refuse the treatment that is ordered, including the right to 
refuse psychotropic medications.
9. The person delivering the copy of the notice and petition to the person alleged to be 
mentally ill shall, at the time of delivery, explain the content, purpose and effect of 
the notice and the legal right to judicial review by habeas corpus.
10. A copy of the notice and the petition shall be delivered at least one day prior to the 
hearing to: the individual initiating the request for protective custody; the attorney 
representing the alleged mentally ill person; the district attorney; the facility in which 
the person is detained; the Department o f  Mental Health and Substance Abuse 
Services; and a parent, spouse, guardian, brother, sister or child of the person alleged 
to be mentally ill who is at least 18 years of age and who did not initiate the petition.
11. The notice may be served personally or by certified mail.
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12. The period o f prehearing detention shall not exceed 72 hours, excluding weekends 
and holidays. Prehearing detention may be extended to coincide with any order of 
continuance entered by the court
13. The court, at the hearing on the petition, shall determine by clear and convincing 
evidence whether the person is a mentally ill person and a person requiring treatment.
With the basics o f  Oklahoma’s emergency detention law outlined, it is time to turn to 
whether those laws, and others like them, are carried out—whether the spirit and the letter of the 
law coincide in any meaningful way. And that leads us to the question o f whether the rights of 
the mentally ill are truly are protected under the law as it is written. There are those who 
maintain that current judicial mandates adequately protect the rights of those mentally ill who 
have fallen under the purview of mental health law. In his paper on the subject, one sociologist 
stated; “Compulsory detention in a psychiatric hospital constrains, but does not remove the rights 
of those admitted. The mental health laws of different countries provide for various mechanisms 
intended to protect the rights o f detained patients.” (Barnes, 1996). Others, even while 
acknowledging years of reform, disagree.
Perlin, Guld & Derfinan (1996) cite case law that found that the same “fundamental 
liberties” in criminal cases are at stake in civil corrunitment proceedings. And yet, the authors 
point out, “ ... .traditionally, involuntary civil commitment procedures have not assured the due 
process safeguards against unjustified deprivation o f liberty that are accorded those accused of a 
crime.” Moreover, they state that “For those with mental disabilities, there is a dearth of 
competent counsel.” Perlin et al. attribute this to ignorance of the law, fear o f  their clients, and 
feeling responsible for the acts of their clients. As a result, they note that attorneys do not
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“zealously” represent their mentally ill clients, and instead represent “what they— the attorneys 
and the advocates— feel is in the client’s best interest or in society’s best in terest”
Such “best interest” representation is at the heart o ( “parens patriae"— a legal power used 
by states to justify their decisions to involuntarily detain or commit mentally ill individuals.
Some feel that the parens patriae power is broadly used to  also label the mentally ill as when, in 
the process o f  civil commitment, individuals are labeled incompetent Winnick (1996) advocates 
a more limited use o f  parens patriae in the area o f  competency. “The adverse effects o f  
incompetency labeling are sufficiently serious that in many contexts, application o f  the label 
should be regarded as a deprivation o f  liberty within the meaning o f  the Constitution. As a result, 
in such contexts, the state’s ability to  use its parens patriae power, which requires labeling an 
individual incompetent, should be limited. In these contexts, constitutional considerations 
suggest that incompetency should be defined more narrowly, that competency should be 
presiuned, and that the burden o f  persuasion should be placed on the party that asserts 
incompetency.”
Some social scientists argue that the process whereby individuals are involuntarily 
detained impacts the detainee more than the actual detention. The p^chological consequences of 
the judicial procedures themselves, asserts Tyler (1996), highly influence how  the mentally ill 
view imposed restrictions on their fireedom, and are highly relevant to the laws as they now 
stand. As quoted earlier in this paper, “People’s evaluations o f  the fairness o f  judicial hearings 
are affected by the opportunities which those procedures provide for people to participate, by the 
degree to which people judge that they are treated with dignity and respect, and by judgments 
about the trustworthiness o f  authorities. Each o f  these factors has more influence on judgments
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of procedural justice than do either evaluations of neutrality or evaluations of the favorableness 
of the outcome of the hearing.”
While investigating the effects of civil commitment on involuntary patients, Kjellin, 
Anderson, CandeQord, Palmstiema and Wallsten (1997) found an association between perceived 
respect for autonomy by authorities and self-reported improvement in mental health. They note 
that “The aim o f both involuntary and voluntary psychiatric care must be to achieve as many 
benefits as possible at the lowest [ethical] cost” Other researchers cite problems with the 
implementation of current involuntary commitment laws. Husted and Nehemkis (1995) studied 
civil commitment from the perspectives o f  police, professionals, and families and found that 
“there is a difference in the subjective understanding of the criteria as delineated in the law. This 
is demonstrated by the fact that the two main groups who are responsible for initial 
implementation of the laws—emergency room mental health staff and police offers in the 
community, significantly disagree on when these laws may be applied.”
Others note that even when it is clear that the law needs to be applied, it may be done so in 
the direction of conunitment, but not in the direction of protecting the rights of those being 
committed. Osuna, Cuenca, Perez-Carceles and Luna (1995) addressed the legal status of the 
chronically ill and noted that “The spirit of the current legislative fiamework is to protect persons 
with mental illness and to guarantee each and every one of their rights. However, it should be 
recognized that promulgation of a new law is not tantamount to its enforcement” Appelbaum 
(1997) took an international look at involuntary commitment laws and said that “The key to 
understanding the difference between commitment law on the books and commitment law in 
practice is to recognize that laws are not self-enforcing. Indeed, implementation of involuntary 
hospitalization is delegated to a variety of participants in the commitment process, all of whom
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have the potential to affect how the law is applied When the results of a law narrowly applied 
will be contrary to the moral intuitions o f these parties, they will act at the margins to modify the 
law in practice to achieve what seem to them to be more reasonable outcomes.”
Applebaum (1997) supports his contentions by citing several pertinent studies. In one 
study, even though the very narrow terms of California’s commitment law were not met, Warren 
(as cited by Applebairra) found that one judge applied “commonsense notions to his decisions.” 
In another study Hiday and Smith (as cited by Applebaum) found that “in 47.5% of commitment 
cases in which the petition lacked any information concerning the statutory dangerousness 
criteria, respondents were committed anyway.” Applebaum contends that failure to abide by 
commitment laws is also a problem for attorneys who represent the mentally ill. He cites a study 
by Poythress who trained lawyers in challenging expert testimony at commitment hearings. 
Poythress (as cited by Applebaum) found that “none of them used the training, because they did 
not see it as their Job to achieve the release of people whom they viewed as genuinely ill.” 
Another study cited by Applebaum had similar findings. Warren (as cited by Applebaum) found 
that attorneys “were not often playing the adversarial role anticipated by the law.” Bottomley (as
cited by Applebaum), found that “many lawyers elect to argue for their version of patients’
needs rather than for patients’ expressed wishes to be released. Lawyers’ presence does not 
guarantee an adversarial proceeding.”
Applebaum (1997) notes that the problem does not just rest with legal participants. “With 
judges and lawyers who are trained to be respectful o f individual rights bending the law when 
that seems to be necessary for patients to receive treatment, it is no surprise that psychiatrists, 
whose primary interest is in providing treatment, do the same. Reviews of commitment petitions 
completed by psychiatrists and other mental heath professionals routinely reveal a failure to
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specify legally required criteria in a large percentage of cases: 16.1% in a North Carolina study 
o f  cases that led to judicial commitment, even higher numbers in a set of Canadian studies” 
(Hiday & Smith; McCready & Merskey; Page & Yates, as cited by Applebaum).
Rubin, Snapp, Panzano and Taynor (1996) found that there are many factors which 
influence the implementation of mental health law, and that these factors may vary within 
individual states operating under the same legal code. Some of the factors include: judges’ 
interpretations of the legal code; clinicians’ attitudes about involuntary treatment; judges’ 
attitudes about outpatient commitment as an alternative to involuntary hospitalization; service 
providers’ liability concerns; the organizational structure of the local mental health delivery 
system; attorneys’ assumptions o f adversarial versus paternalistic positions in the courtroom; law 
enforcement officials’ levels of cooperation, and the communities’ demographic characteristics. 
Bursztajn, Hamm and Gutheil (1997) have also looked at which factors influence the 
implementation o f civil commitment laws. In a single case study of a judge’s decision process 
for civil corrunitment, they foimd that the judge considered factors not directly specified by the 
law. “Among the specific factors this judge used in considering whether the law’s general 
principles applied in each case were the patient’s competence, predictability, and reliability as an 
outpatient, as well as \Wrether family and friends favor commitment.”
Certainly, the medico-legal decision to involimtarily commit a person to treatment is not 
an easy one. Anderson and Eppard (1995) studied psychiatrists, nurses and counselors with 
regard to clinical decision making during assessment for involuntary psychiatric admission and 
identified nine structural elements: “The process o f clinical decision making for involuntary 
psychiatric admission is systematic, cautious, and individualized. It is important to connect with 
the client and use intuitive reasoning State-mandated criteria must be met, and treatment
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alternatives considered. All contingencies cannot be controlled. The decision to involuntarily 
admit a patient is never made alone.” The preceding criteria appear to meld well with both the 
spirit and the letter o f our current laws, which mandate a thorough, well-documented process that 
includes procedural safeguards to protect the rights of those most intimately affected by 
commitment decisions. Eriksson and Estrin (1995) though, found that the patients they surveyed 
felt a sense of “fait accompli” with regard to the coercive measures involved in the commitment 
process. Indeed, 51% of the surveyed patients who were committed reported that “they had been 
violated as a person/human being.”
Oklahoma, like many other states, has seen lawsuits related to issues surrounding the 
detention of the mentally ill. One such lawsuit was explored in the Opinions o f the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court (1997), and is officially known as Wofford vs. Mental Health Services, Inc.
Court records show that Dawn Wofford was feeling suicidal on the night of October 29,1990, 
and subsequently voluntarily admitted herself to Parkside Hospital. Earlier in the evening she 
had been refused admission at another hospital because of a lack of insurance. As part of the 
admission process at Parkside, Mrs. Wofford signed a consent form that stipulated the conditions 
of her voluntary discharge from the hospital. Her signature acknowledged that to be released, she 
would be required to submit a written request to the administrator and the medical director of the 
hospital, and that the hospital would be allowed to hold her for only 3 days after her written 
request.
Approximately 12 hours after her admission, Ms. Wofford requested, in writing, that she 
be released from Parkside Hospital. On November 2,1990,4 days after her admission, an order 
allowing Parkside to detain Ms. Wofford was filed with the court Mrs. Wofford responded by 
filing a writ of habeus corpus, after which the hospital released her. When one examines the
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dates of Ms. Wofford’s entrance and exit from Parkside, it is apparent that the hospital held her 
for only one day past the mandatory 3 days stipulated in the consent form she signed. 
Nevertheless, a lawsuit for false imprisonment was fried and ultimately won by ^vfrs.Wofford. 
Due to procedural problems involving the various judges who had heard the 5 year long case, the 
verdict was later overturned on appeals. However, at the conclusion of the appeals trial, and after 
the jury was discharged, one o f the Supreme Court judges hearing the case made the following 
statement to the assembled plaintiff and defendants;
1 think that what you did to this woman was absolutely outrageous and a disgrace to your 
system and a disgrace to my system. This hospital had no authority to keep this woman, 
mentally ill or not, without following court procedures, good intentions or not And I think that’s 
outrageous. And I hope-you know, I certainly respect this jury’s verdict but I hope, because you 
walk out o f here scott free, that you don’t take that as a license to continue to falsely imprison 
people like Mrs. Wofford. I am absolutely appalled. And, again, I have some faith that you will 
do whatever you need to do to straighten that out
The hypothesis was developed that although current mental health law was designed to 
carefully protect the rights of mentally ill individuals, the letter of the law and its practice do not 
consistently coincide in such a way as to fulfill the purpose and intent of the law. Judges are 
legally and ethically responsible for ensuring that the rights o f  the mentally ill are protected with 
regard to decisions made in their (the judges) courtrooms. A lack of training in mental health law 
and/or a lack o f training in understanding abnormal psychology may account for this variance. 
Anecdotal observations point to several deficiencies with regards to how the rights of the 
mentally ill are carried out Most notably they include:
1. Sections of the legal, notarized paperwork are filled in by those other than licensed mental 
health professionals. Often sections are left blank and/or do not give the information 
requested by the court
119
Prospectus/Gail Poyner 18
2. Judges appear to trust that the examinations o f the mentally ill and the attendant paperwork 
have been completed as mandated by law, and make decisions based on those assumptions.
3. When patients do not appear to meet the criteria of dangerousness to self or others, or as 
being unable to care for their own basic needs, judges often commit
4. When patients’ presentations are contrary to what the Licensed Mental Health Professional’s 
statement outlines, the statement is generally considered more relevant
5. The adversarial process dictated by law is not present in involuntary commitment hearings.
6. The mentally ill are often not informed of their rights, and a member of the family is rarely 
notified, as specified by law.
C. Rationale
Given the above considerations, the research proposed herein has the potential for 
significant practical value. Researching the training practices of future attorneys by law schools 
with regard to mental health law and abnormal psychology may shed light on possible training 
deficits. Further, this research has the potential to integrate current knowledge regarding the 
involuntary commitment process with recommendations for training. Given that there is evidence 
that mental health patients respond to involuntary treatment better when they perceive the 
process as being administered fairly, the potential information gleaned from this study could help 
point to the need for better and more specific training in mental health law and abnormal 
psychology for the attorneys and judges who cany out the law’s mandates by making decisions 
regarding the freedom or commitment of the mentally ill.




The specific aims of this study are: 1) to survey the training directors o f American Bar 
Association and American Association of Law Schools accredited training programs to 
determine the percentage of training programs that require training in mental health law, 2) to 
survey the training directors of American Bar Association and American Association of Law 
Schools accredited training programs to determine the percentage of training programs that 
require training in abnormal psychology; 3) to determine what methods are used to train 
attorneys in recognizing mental illness; 4) to determine how much training attorneys receive in 
mental health law and abnormal psychology; 5) to determine if  electives are offered in the areas 
of mental health law and abnormal psychology; and 6) to formulate training recommendations 
for American Bar Association and American Association of Law Schools accredited law 
programs in the areas o f mental health law and abnormal p^chology.
Hvraotheses
Null Hypotheses:
1 ) More than fifty percent o f American Bar Association and American Association of 
Law Schools accredited training programs will provide training in mental health law 
and abnormal psychology.
2) Those offering training will mandate one or more courses in both mental health law 
and abnormal psychology.
3) There will be no need for recommendations for strengthening attorney/judge 




1 ) Less than fifty percent of American Bar Association and American Association of 
Law Schools accredited training programs will provide training in mental health law 
and abnormal psychology.
2) Those offering training will do so on an elective basis.
3) There will be a need for specific recommendations regarding training in the areas of 
mental health law and abnormal psychology.
in METHOD
A. Selection of Subiects
A list of American Bar Association and American Association o f Law Schools accredited 
training programs will be used for this research study. Research packets will be mailed to the 
training directors of all American Bar Association and American Association of Law Schools 
accredited training programs in the United States (171) during the month of October, 2000. Full 
research packets will be sent in a follow-up mailing, approximately 6 weeks later, to those who 
do not respond to the initial mailing.
B. Procedure
The training directors will be asked to complete a short survey that will cover the 
objectives of the study (copy attached). A stamped and addressed envelope will be provided to 
the training directors to return the completed survey.
C. Human Experimentation Considerations
Although this study proposes to investigate the mental health law and abnormal 
psychology training provided to law school students, it is believed that the study’s design will 
preclude an undue stress to subjects. Further, given that American Bar Association and American
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Association of Law Schools accredits these institutions their curriculum and training practices 
should lend themselves to some scrutiny.
Before completing the study each subject will be asked to read and sign a consent form. 
No direct benefits to participants are provided as part of this research. Participants will be made 
aware of all human subjects rights, including the voluntary nature of participation. There is no 
deception in any o f the research procedures. No direct risks have been identified for potential 
respondents. A certification of participant consent will be included in each research packet 
Results will be available to participants upon request,
IV. STATISTICAL ANAYSIS OF DATA
Analyses for this exploratory study will largely be descriptive in nature, and will be used 
to describe the current training practices of accredited Law Schools in the areas of mental health 
law and abnormal psychology. Correlational analyses will be conducted in order to examine the 
relationships between training institution variables, including the student population of the 
institution, number o f students in the ABA and AALS accredited program, number of fiill-time 
faculty, and number of part-time or adjunct faculty. A logistic regression analysis will also be 
conducted to detennine those particular variables that might help explain why certain training 
programs offer training in mental health law and abnormal psychology while others do not
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